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A PROBLEM OF PRIVILEGE: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL AND THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Alison M. Hill*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many companies have hired lawyers to work as
in-house legal counsel in an attempt to obtain necessary legal work in an
efficient manner.' In the U.S. these lawyers are governed by the same
ethical and disciplinary rules as other attorneys in their jurisdiction.2
However, in some of the countries in the European Community (EC) in-
house counsel are treated differently, and not permitted to be members of
the bar.3 When the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was faced with the
question of whether to permit in-house counsel in the EC to exercise the
attorney-client privilege,4 it looked to the rules and laws in the Member
States and determined that in-house counsel would not be given the
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1995).
Multinational corporations make great efforts at high cost to obtain expert legal advice
in all the jurisdictions in which they operate. However, the very complexity of
multibillion dollar enterprises, with numerous products and services marketed and
manufactured by tens or even hundreds of thousands of people throughout the world,
requires that the confidential communication with legal counsel be conducted in a
particular manner in order that it may reach the right people at the appropriate decision-
making level and also be cost effective. Modem multinational corporations have, there-
fore, engaged fully qualified lawyers to work in-house to provide this legal service,
since it is virtually impossible for outside counsel to perform this function adequately.
Peter H. Burkard, Attorney-Client Privilege in the EEC: The Perspective of Multination-
al Corporate Counsel, 20 INT'L LAw. 677, 686 (1986).
In the U.S. as of 1990, 10% of attorneys, over 55,000 attorneys, were employed
in private industry. "In addition to just numbers, the quality of work being performed
has undergone a significant change. . . . More and more substantive work - including
litigation = is being performed by the corporation's own attorneys." Thomas B.
Metzloff, Ethical Considerations for the Corporate Legal Counsel, available in Westlaw,
C566 ALi-ABA 109, 111 (1990).
2 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the
attorney-client privilege in the EC.
See infra notes 100-10 and accompanying text for a similar discussion in the U.S.
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attorney-client privilege that exists for independent attorneys in the EC.'
The decision was based on the assumption that once attorneys are em-
ployed by a corporation they can no longer be independent.' This as-
sumption was the basis for the decision of several countries of the EC
not to permit attorneys who became employees to remain members of the
bar.7 The decision by the ECJ raises the question of whether in-house
counsel should be treated like other attorneys, or whether there are
significant differences which require that in-house counsel be governed by
different rules.
This Note will answer that question by exploring the attorney-client
privilege in the EC and the U.S., and whether its policies and goals can
be better met when the privilege is given to in-house counsel. Section II
of the Note will discuss the rules that apply to attorneys in the EC, and
how and why the rules were formed. Section Im will focus on the same
issues in the U.S. Section IV will discuss whether the attorney-client
privilege should be available to in-house counsel. The final section will
conclude that the EC should modify its rules to permit in-house counsel
to exercise the attorney-client privilege in Member States where they
remain members of the bar.
II. THE RULES OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE EC
Although the attorney-client privilege is not specifically granted by
the laws of the EC, the ECJ held in AM & S v. Commission,' that under
' The case posing the question for the ECJ was Case 155/79, AM & S Europe
Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575. After this decision was handed down the
American Bar Association, supported by the U.S. State Department, requested that the
European Community provide
the same protection, including the procedural safeguards, against disclosure of written
communications with a U.S. lawyer that Community law accords to a client's written
communications with a lawyer of a member state of the European Community. . . . The
report contends that any lesser protection than full privilege would deny clients of U.S.
lawyers a right that U.S. courts and antitrust enforcement agencies grant to clients of
European lawyers.
EC Attorney-Client Privilege Extension to House Counsel Supported by U.S., Int'l Trade
Rep, U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) (October 12, 1983).
6 Not only must [the in-house lawyer] be sensitive to the interests and activities of his
employer, but he must take due account of the opinions and attitudes of his superi-
ors. . . . Permanent involvement with the activities of one firm and direct dependence
on this firm for their salary is thought to lead in-house lawyers to identify themselves
with the firm's interest to the detriment of their independence. ...
Theofanis Christoforou, Protection of Legal Privilege in EEC Competition Law: The
Imperfections of a Case, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 16 (1985-1986).
See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575.
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certain circumstances the privilege does exist. "That general principles
which have not been expressly stated in the Treaty or subordinate legisla-
tion may exist as part of the Community law, the observance of which
the Court is required to ensure, needs no emphasis."9 In determining the
rule of law, the ECJ compared the laws of the Member States and
determined the best resolution for the Community.0 AM & S was an
important decision because it defined the scope of attorney-client privilege
in the EC and gave notice to all attorneys that the protection was limited
to particular lawyers in particular circumstances.
A. The AM & S Case
AM & S was the first opportunity for the ECJP to investigate the
existence of the attorney-client privilege for attorneys in the EC. The case
came before the ECJ on an appeal by AM & S Europe Ltd.2 (AM &
This case was somewhat unusual procedurally because after the initial oral
arguments and opinion written by Advocate General Warner on January 20, 1981
[hereinafter Warner's opinion], the ECJ reopened oral arguments. The result was that
two advocate general opinions were written before the case was decided by the ECJ.
The second opinion, written by Advocate General Slynn, was issued on January 26,
1982 [hereinafter Slynn's opinion]. The final decision of the ECJ was issued on May
18, 1982. See generally P.J. Duffy, Legal Privilege and Community Law, 132 NEW L.J.
580, 581 (1982).
1 Slynn's opinion, AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1648.
10 There is complete agreement that when the Court interprets or supplements Com-
munity law on a comparative law basis it is not obliged to take the minimum which
the national solutions have in common, or their arithmetic mean or the solution pro-
duced by a majority of the legal systems as the basis of its decision. The Court has
to weigh up and evaluate the particular problem and search for the 'best' and 'most
appropriate' solution.
Id. at 1649 (quoting Kutschler, Methods of Interpretation as seen by a Judge at the
Court of Justice, JuDICIAL AND ACADEMIC CONFERENCE 1976 at 29).
" There are six Advocates General to the ECJ. Each is a member of the court but
does not have a vote in the final decision by the Court. The Advocate General
assigned to a particular case acts as an independent adviser, who researches the law,
analyzes the facts and issues an opinion. According to Article 166 of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, the Advocate General's role is to act "with
complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions
on cases brought before the Court of Justice, in order to assist the Court in the per-
formance of the task assigned to it in Article 164." The judges are not bound to
decide the case in accord with the Advocate General's opinion. After hearing the ar-
guments of the parties and reviewing the opinion of the Advocate General, the ECJ
issues a decision on the case. See L. NEvILLE BROWN, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CoMmuNmEs (1989).
2 AM & S Europe Limited is an English company. "It is a subsidiary of an Aus-
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S) from a decision by the Commission of the European Communities (the
Commission) which required AM & S to turn documents over to the
Commission for its investigation of an alleged breach of competition
regulations by AM & S.'3 The attorneys for AM & S refused to give
the Commission the documents it requested because they argued that the
documents were subject to attorney-client privilege.'4 Some of the docu-
ments involved in the case were prepared by in-house counsel and some
were prepared by attorneys in private practice.'5
1. The Facts of the Case
On February 20 and 21, 1979, three officials from the Commission
conducted an investigation at the AM & S facility at its premises in
tralian company, Australian Mining and Smelting Limited. Both companies belong to
the well-known Rio Tinto Zinc group. A subsidiary of [AM & S] owns and operates
a zinc smelter at Avonmouth, near Bristol [England]." Warner's opinion, AM & S,
1982 E.C.R. at 1620.
"3 Article 85 and 86 deal with prohibition of anti-competition or restraint of trade
by companies within the EC.
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common mar-
ket ....
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [hereinafter EEC
TREATY] art. 85.
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such
abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
'4 There were two major disputes in this case: (1) what powers the Commission
had to require AM & S to turn over documents, and (2) what procedures should be
used to determine whether the documents would be afforded privilege.
Under Regulation 17 (11) the Commission
may obtain all necessary information from the Governments and competent authorities
of the Member States and from undertakings and associations of undertakings. ...
Where an undertaking or association of undertakings does not supply the information re-
quested within the time limit fixed by the Commission, or supplies incomplete informa-
tion, the Commission shall by decision require the information to be supplied.
Council Regulation 17, art. 11, 1962 J.O. (204) 1; 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED. 87, 90
[hereinafter Regulation 17].
" See infra note 22.
IN-HOUSE COUNSEL PRIVILEGE
Bristol, England in an attempt to determine the "competitive conditions
concerning the production and distribution of zinc metals and its alloys
and zinc concentrates in order to verify that there is no infringement of
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty."'6 During and immediately after
the initial investigation, AM & S refused to allow the inspectors to see
some of the requested documents. 7 After declining AM & S's invitation
to find a mutually agreeable way of determining whether the documents
were privileged, the Commission issued a decision on July 6, 1979.
Under Article (3) of Regulation 17,"8 the Commission determined that
AM & S had to submit to a new investigation and turn over all the
documents that had previously been requested for which privilege was
claimed. 9
AM & S continued to refuse to allow the officials to see the alleged-
ly privileged documents in full." On October 4, 1979, AM & S brought
suit against the Commission asking the ECJ to declare the decision of the
Commission void, or alternatively void at least as far as it required
disclosure of entire documents to the inspector even though privilege was
claimed.2 There were three types of documents in dispute: documents
requesting advice, documents giving advice and documents which sum-
marized advice.'
6 AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1579.
17 At the end of the investigation, though, AM & S permitted the officials to take
copies of some documents with them and the Commission left a requesd for additional
documents. In March 1979, AM & S refused to give the Commission the additional
documents it had requested because AM & S claimed they were privileged. Id.
" Article (3) of Regulation 17 provides that: "[w]here the Commission, upon ap-
plication or upon its own initiative, finds there is infringement of article 85 or article
86 of the Treaty, it may by decision require the undertaking or associations of
undertaking concerned to bring such infringement to an end." Regulation 17, art. 3,
supra note 14, at 88.
19 AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1579.
' They did agree, however, to show part of each document so that the officials
could satisfy themselves that they were privileged. Id. at 1580.
I2 d. at 1581.
' Slynn's opinion, id. at 1643. Specifically the documents included:
A. Documents requesting advice:
1. a letter requesting legal advice from in-house counsel of another company
("the Service Company") to AM & S destined for barristers in private practice;
2. a request for legal advice from executive of AM & S to a private solicitor
in England;
3. a telex from an executive of AM & S to another executive of AM & S
suggesting that legal advice should be sought from a solicitor in private practice
in a third country;
B. Documents giving advice:
1995]
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2. The Arguments of the Parties
One side of the dispute was argued by AM & S with support from
two intervenors: the government of the U.K. and the Consultative Com-
mittee of the Bars and Laws Societies of the European Community'
1. a memorandum containing legal advice from an in-house lawyer of another
part AM & S's corporate family in a third country to employees of a third
subsidiary of AM & S's parent;
2. a letter containing legal advice on the law of a third country from a solicitor
in private practice to an employee of AM & S's parent;
3. a letter containing legal advice from a solicitor in private practice in England
to a third subsidiary of AM & S's parent;
4. letters containing legal advice sent by a solicitor in private practice in England
to executives of AM & S;
5. a memorandum containing legal advice sent by an in-house lawyer employed
by the Service Company to executives at AM & S;
C. Documents summarizing advice:
1. a memorandum summarizing the legal advice of the in-house lawyer of the
Service Company sent between executives of AM & S;
2. a memorandum summarizing legal advice of the in-house lawyer of the
Service Company sent by an executive of AM & S to an executive of AM &
S's parent;
3. a memorandum summarizing legal advice of a private solicitor in England sent
between executives of AM & S;
4. telexes summarizing legal advice from barristers and solicitors in private
practice in a third country between executives of AM & S and executives of
AM & S's parent.
See id. at 1643-44.
Some of the documents involved in this case were prepared for members of the
Rio Tinto Zinc group other than AM & S. However, the ECJ previously recognized
that
the reality of the relationship between the members of a group of companies forming
one economic unit may mean that their separate legal personality has to be treated as
a formal rather than a substantial distinction. . . . Moreover, legal advice prepared by
either lawyers employed or those in private practice retained by one member of the
group may in fact be requested on behalf of all the members of the group.
Id. at 1661 (citation omitted).
" The Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community is now known as the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the Euro-
pean Community (CCBE). It is composed of national delegations from the 12 Member
States. Its objects, among others, are:
(a) To act as a joint body on behalf of the Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community in all matters involving the application of Community Treaties and Commu-
nity law to the legal profession.
(b) To co-ordinate the views, policies and activities of the Bars and Law Societies of
the European Community in their common dealings with the European institutions.
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(CCBE). On the other side, the French Republic intervened on behalf of
the Commission. The parties said that they agreed that privilege existed
in the EC and that the company must prove the privilege; the case before
the ECJ was simply a matter of what procedure should be used to
determine whether a document is privileged. 4 However, much of the
debate between the parties centered around the scope of the privilege.
AM & S was concerned that the procedure not permit the Commis-
sion to see the document in order to determine whether it was privi-
leged.' AM & S argued that the objective of determining whether a
document is privileged could be accomplished without the Commission
viewing the entire document.26 The U.K. suggested a system that would
give the ECJ the authority to make a final determination if the parties
could not reach an agreement.27
(g) To study and promote the study of all questions affecting the profession of lawyer
and to develop solutions designed to co-ordinate and harmonise the practice of that pro-
fession.
HAMISH ADAMSON, FREE MOVEMENT OF LAWYERS 3 (1992).
24 AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1581-82. In his opinion to the ECJ Advocate General
Warner said the "questions here at issue relate to the extent to which, and the manner
in which, communications between a lawyer and his client may be protected from
disclosure in an investigation under Article 14." Warner's opinion, id. at 1620.
' AM & S argued that a procedure needed to be developed whereby the privileged
nature of the document could be determined "without the Commission being entitled to
see the contents of the material for which protection is claimed. In the ultimate event
of a disagreement between the parties, it is only the Court of Justice which is in a
position to inspect the documents and adjudicate the dispute." If the Commission
viewed the entire document to determine whether it was privileged, "the confidentiality
of the documents would be destroyed and the protection rendered largely valueless."
AM & S, 1982, E.C.R. at 1581-82. Although the Commission claimed that its investi-
gators would not use any information gained from documents, the company would be
in the difficult position of attempting to prove that the inspector used the protected
knowledge. Id. at 1589.
AM & S argued that the objective of determining whether a document is privi-
leged could and should be accomplished without the Commission viewing the entire
document. The principle of proportionality recognized by the EC requires "that the
means used must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective sought." Id.
at 1588.
" The U.K., who intervened on behalf of AM & S suggested that until a Commu-
nity solution to the problem was reached, perhaps the national courts could hear the
cases. The U.K. said that the solution to the problem must "(i) be fair and be seen to
be fair, (ii) be carried out by persons who are qualified and impartial; (iii) exclude any
risk (and even the appearance of a risk) of information obtained in the course of
verification being used in breach of legal privilege." Otherwise the procedure itself
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The CCBE argued that EC law recognized the principle of legal
privilege and that the principle was part of the law of every Member
State.2" The CCBE went further than AM & S and the U.K. and claimed
that legal privilege was a "practical guarantee of fundamental, constitu-
tional or human rights."29 The CCBE proposed that the parties attempt
to settle the dispute through the use of experts or arbitration.3"
The Commission argued that although the attorney-client privilege
was important, it was not an existing principle of Community law and its
importance was outweighed by the need to have all relevant evidence
before the Court.3' The Commission contended that the protection of
privilege must be balanced against the need to have all evidence before
the Court, and therefore wanted some verification before evidence was
excluded in a given case.32
France claimed that Community law did not provide for protection
of documents between a lawyer and client (whether in-house or not) and
that legal privilege was not "a principle common to the laws of all
Member States"33 because of the differences in the principle in each
would not protect the legal confidence. Id. at 1595-7.
' Id. at 1599. CCBE suggested that "not only do all Member States afford some
protection to confidential relations between lawyer and client, but there is a remarkable
consistency in the explanations of the ratio legis and a clearly discernible tendency to
extend rather than to reduce the scope of that protection." Id. at 1600.
9 Id.
o An expert could be used who would "confine himself to describing the docu-
ments or . . . [giving] an opinion as to whether the documents were entitled to
protection or not." Alternatively, if the expert system were not permissible under
Community law, then the parties could agree to arbitration to make the determination.
Id. at 1602.
3" The Commission's argument had two parts: 1) the principle of privilege is
nowhere an absolute rule with fixed, clear limits which overrides other legal principles
when they conflict, but one of several legal principles which can be differently regu-
lated and reconciled according to the circumstances; and 2) the AM & S procedure
was not satisfactory because of the need to have all relevant evidence before the court
and the need to prove clearly why evidence should not be disclosed if privilege is
claimed. Id. at 1585.
The Commission rejected the AM & S procedure for four reasons: 1) it could eas-
ily be abused by dishonest companies; 2) the Commission would be placed in the
impossible position of trying to determine whether the lawyer claiming the privilege
could be trusted; 3) the inspector may belief he has not seen enough of the document
to determine whether privilege is justified or not; and 4) it may be necessary to see
the entire document in order to resolve related questions. Id. at 1587-8.
32 Id. at 1586. However, the Commission urged that decisions about whether a
particular item is privileged should be determined on a case-by-case basis and in light
of all the circumstances. Id. at 1584.
33 Id. at 1598.
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country. Furthermore, France argued that the creation of the principle of
privilege as part of community law would prevent the "direct and uniform
application in all the Member States of the provisions of Regulation
Number 17" and should not be permitted.' France contended that per-
mitting companies to claim privilege and preventing the Commission from
seeing any document in full would frustrate the ability of the Commission
to exercise its investigative powers granted by Regulation No. 17.
3. The Holding and Rationale of the Case
The ECJ decided that the attorney-client privilege did exist in some
form in each of the Member States and therefore had to be recognized as
part of EC law. In reaching its decision, the ECJ relied heavily on
Advocate General Warner's conclusion drawn from The Edward Report 6
that "the differences between the laws of the different countries in the
Community 'are differences of approach or method (made necessary by
their fundamentally different legal systems) rather than differences of
result. ' ' 37 In accepting the existence of the attorney-client privilege as a
Even though a certain amount of protection is to be found in the laws of all the
Member States, it varies so much in its content that it is difficult to elevate that
protection into a 'principle common to the laws of the Member States' and even more
questionable to turn it into a rule of law capable of altering the meaning of Community
texts . ..
Id. Regulation 17 provides specific measures by which the Commission can ensure
compliance with Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC TREATY. See supra note 13.
' "Undertakings would then be treated differently depending on whether the law of
the Member State where they are established does or does not confer (or confers
subject to stricter limits) protection for certain documents." AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at
1597-98.
35 [T]he Commission has acted within the framework of the powers conferred on it by
Regulation No. 17 .... [I]t would be contrary to that regulation to infer from it that
the Commission may not have access to the whole contents of a document in order to
check whether the protection claimed is well-founded. To decide otherwise would be to
open the door to abuses, which are always possible.
Id. at 1598-99.
' The Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the European
Community published a report: D.A.O. EDWARD, THE PROFESSIONAL SECRET, CoNFI-
DENTIALITY AND LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE IN THE NINE MEMBER STATES OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1976) [hereinafter THE EDWARD REPORT]. It was a
comparative law study of the laws of the Member States with regard to the varying
concepts of confidentiality and privilege. AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1622.
, Id. at 1622 (quoting THE EDWARD REPORT, supra note 36). Warner's summary
of THE EDWARD REPORT had four points. First, "some protection for the confidentiality
of communications between lawyer and client is given by the laws of all the Member
States: ' Second, "the protection is afforded primarily by imposing on the lawyer an
19951
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part of EC law, the ECJ recognized the importance of freedom of consul-
tation with lawyers.3"
However, the scope of the privilege recognized did not include
attorneys employed by the legal department of a company. The ECJ said
there are to be found in the national laws of the Member States com-
mon criteria inasmuch as those laws protect, in similar circumstances,
the confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and client
provided that, on the one hand, such communications are made for the
purposes, and in the interest of the client's rights of defence, and on the
other hand, they emanate from independent lawyers, that is to say,
lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employ-
ment.39
Thus a two-part test' was created to determine whether documents could
qualify as privileged. The attorney-client privilege applies only to written
communications which occur after the initiation of an administrative pro-
cedure or to earlier communications which have a subject-matter relation-
ship to the procedure, and the attorney must be independent. The require-
ment of independent status
is based on the conception of the lawyer's role as collaborating in the
administration of justice by the courts and as being required to provide,
in full independence, and in the overriding interest of that cause, such
legal assistance as the client needs .... Such a conception reflects the
legal traditions common to the Member States and is also to be found
in legal order of the Community, as is demonstrated by Article 17 of
the Protocols in the Statutes of the Court of Justice of the EEC and the
EAEC, and also by Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the
Court of Justice of the ECSC.41
obligation not to disclose the contents of those communications." Third, "the develop-
ment of the law has been largely conditioned by procedural rules characteristic of the
legal system of that country." Finally, "the development of the law in each country has
been conditioned by the organization of the legal profession in that country." Id. at
1632.
" ECJ determined the attorney-client privilege "serves the requirements, the im-
portance of which is recognized in all of the Member States, that any person must be
able, without constraint, to consult a lawyer whose profession entails the giving of
independent legal advice to all those in need of it." AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1610.
39 Id. at 1611.
o The requirement that the communication be "in the interest of the client's rights
of defence" is not a limiting requirement, as the right of defense has been very broadly
interpreted. See, e.g., LINDA S. SPEDDING, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACrICE IN THE
EEC AND THE UNITED STATES 127 (1987); Christoforou, supra note 6, at 9.
41 AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1611-2. Article 17 of the Protocols of the Court of
[Vol. 27:145
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Although the independence requirement did not receive much atten-
tion in the final opinion, it is a very important provision. The decision
was based on the assumption that once an attorney is employed by a
company, he no longer has the ability to remain free from improper
influence by his client.42 However, this assumption is questionable.43
Justice of the EEC and of the EAEC states that:
Other parties must be represented by a lawyer entitled to practice before a court of a
Member State. Such agents, advisers and lawyers shall, when they appear before the
Court, enjoy the rights and immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their
duties, under conditions laid down in the rules of procedure.
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Community, art. 17, established by
EEC TREATY, supra note 13, art. 4; Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Atomic Energy Community, art. 17, established by TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPE-
AN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, art. 3, [hereinafter EURATOM TREATY].
Article 20 of the Protocols of the Court of Justice of the ECSC states that:
Undertakings and all other natural or legal persons must be represented by a
lawyer entitled to practice before a court of a Member State.
Such agents, advisers and lawyers shall, when they appear before the Court, enjoy
the rights and immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their duties, under
conditions laid down in rules drawn up by the Court and submitted for the approval of
the Council, acting unanimously.
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 20,
established by TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNrrY,
art. 7 [hereinafter ECSC TREATY].
' [The inference is that lawyers who are bound to the client by a relationship of
employment are:
(i) not independent;
(ii) subject to the directions of the employer, which may conflict diametrically with the
obligation to produce documents; and
(iii) therefore capable of being subjected to pressures which might prevent the salaried
legal adviser from exercising the independent discretion in relation to production of
documents which alone could justify extending the activities of such advisers the shield
of legal privilege.
Stephen Charles, Legal Professional Privilege: Continued Erosion, 57 LAW INST. J. 832,
833 (1983).
"' This assumption is not accepted by the U.S. and several countries of the EC
where in-house counsel have the attorney-client privilege. Additionally, in both Slynn
and Warner's opinions, the need to differentiate between in-house and independent
counsel was questioned. "I would reject any suggestion that lawyers (professionally
qualified and subject to professional discipline) who are employed full time by ...the
legal departments of private undertakings, are not to be regarded as having such profes-
sional independence as to prevent them from being within the rule." Slynn's opinion,
AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1655. Warner quoted a paper written by two members of the
legal service of the Commission. Although the paper expressed their personal views and
did not bind the Commission, they said, "[t]here seems to be no reason to treat
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The ECJ determined that although in-house counsel in some Member
States were fully licensed to practice and subject to the rules of the bar
or law society in their country, they were not permitted the right to
attorney-client privilege4 that their fellow attorneys had. This result
discriminates against those attorneys who remain members of the bar and
subject to its rules and discipline, and puts them in an unfair position
with respect to other attorneys in their country.
The decision also granted the attorney-client privilege only to
attorneys entitled to practice in one of the Member States.41 This limita-
tion has significant effect on attorneys who are not entitled to practice in
one of the Member States whether they are in-house or independent
lawyers.46 The possibility has been raised that the EC might negotiate
with foreign states to recognize legal privilege on a reciprocal basis.4
salaried lawyers employed by their client differently from independent lawyers in
professional practice, provided that they are effectively subject to similar rules of pro-
fessional ethics and discipline." Warner's opinion, id. at 1623 (citation omitted).
' The EC views the attorney-client privilege as a right of the lawyer, not of the
client. The CCBE Code in Rule 2.3.1 states: "Confidentiality is therefore a primary
right and duty of the lawyer." ADAMSON, supra note 23, at app. 5, xlvii.
S"T]he protection thus afforded by Community law ... to written communica-
tions between lawyer and client must apply without distinction to any lawyer entitled
to practice his profession in one of the Member States, regardless of the Member State
in which the client lives." AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1612.
4 U.S. attorneys currently are permitted to provide legal services in individual
countries in the EC through bi-lateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.
The countries with which the U.S. has signed these treaties agree to "reciprocally
guarantee nationals and companies the right to engage lawyers of their choice." Dan R.
Mastromarco, Disparity in the Application of Legal Principles as a Form of Trade
Restraint: Attorney-Client Privilege in the European Community, 13 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 479, 491-92 (1990).
Therefore it would seem that the best hope for non-EC-qualified U.S. attorneys
seeking access to the EC legal market would be to turn to the national treatment and
most-favoured-nation status provisions of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation
with EC member states. However, it should be noted that these are merely bilateral
treaties and as such do not entitle the U.S. lawyer to gain access to the EC as a
whole.
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(1993). See also Ian S. Forrester, Legal Professional Privilege: Limitations on the
Commission's Powers of Inspection Following the AM & S Judgment, 20 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 75, 83 (1983); K.P.E. Lasok, AM & S - The Court Decides, [1982]
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 99, 104.
47 In the interest of international equity and to avoid any deterioration of relations be-
tween the Community and countries in which the same professional ethics are respected,
the Commission believes that it may be useful for the Community to conclude bilateral
international agreements with interested third countries, on the basis of reciprocity, with
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However, ten years after this possibility was raised, no such agreements
have been reached.5
B. Status of In-House Counsel in the EC
Several of the Member States in the EC do not recognize in-house
counsel as members of the legal profession and do not permit them to be
members of the bar.49 This fact was very influential in the decision not
to grant in-house counsel the right to the attorney-client privilege in AM
& S. In reaching its decision the ECJ reviewed the legal systems of the
Member States to determine whether, and to what extent, communications
between clients and attorneys were considered privileged. "Since the aim
of Community law is to find the best solution having regard to national
laws, it is necessary to examine the spirit, orientation and general tenden-
cy of the national laws on legal privilege."5
There is a slight difference in the underlying concept of privilege in
the common law countries and the civil law countries. The concept of
privilege in countries whose legal system developed from common law is
"legal professional privilege."'" The privilege is a rule of evidence
"which protects all aspects of the relationship between the lawyer and the
client"5 2 and protects advice in the hands of either party. 3 In civil law
the aim of extending legal privilege to the lawyers of these countries.
Commission, Thirteen Report on Competition Policy 65 (1984).
For independent lawyers not entitled to practice . . in a Member State (foreign law-
yers), some hope is offered by the prospect of negotiations between the Community and
non-Member countries with a view to concluding agreements for the reciprocal recogni-
tion of legal privilege. If foreign lawyers are not to be treated differently from their
Community counterparts, any possible agreement will have to be based on the criteria
laid down by the Court in AM & S.
Jonathan Faull, AM & S: the Commission's Practice Note, 8 EUR. L. REV. 411, 413-14
(1983).
48 TYRRELL, supra note 46, at 397.
41 "As I understand it in some Member States full-time employment is incompatible
with the full professional status of a lawyer (apparently in Belgium, France, Italy and
Luxembourg): in others the employed lawyer remains subject to professional discipline
and ethics." Slynn's opinion, AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1655.
o AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1600. "[When the Court derives general principles
from the divergent laws and legal systems of the member states to restrict a validly
promulgated regulation, it must take care not to offend any of the countries composing
the community." Andrew N. Vollmer, U.S. Lawyers Excluded from Protection in EEC
Cases, LEGAL TIMEs, July 26, 1982, at 16.
51 SPEDDING, supra note 40, at 127.
52 Id. at 127-8.
53 AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1584.
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countries the concept is "professional secret and it is a criminal offence
to reveal another's secret." Information given to the attorney is protect-
ed but information communicated from him is not."5 In the six original
Member States protection is only given to documents in the lawyer's
possession."
1. Member States That Do Not Allow Membership in the Bar for
In-House Counsel
Four of the countries in the EC do not permit in-house counsel to be
members of the bar: Italy, France, Belgium and Luxembourg.57 In these
countries it is a crime for an attorney to reveal a confidence of his
client.5" In-house attorneys in these countries are not permitted to be
practicing lawyers because of the belief that once they become in-house
attorneys they cannot remain sufficiently independent.59 These countries
have provisions in their codes which provide that a relationship of
employment is incompatible with the practice of law and therefore
impermissible. 6
In France a breach of professional secrecy is a criminal offense.6'
54 SPEDDING, supra note 40, at 127. For relevant provisions see infra note 67
(Belgium); note 70 (Italy); note 61 (France); and note 74 (Luxembourg).
5 AM & S, 1982 E.C.R., at 1584. "Documents written to a lawyer or by a lawyer
requesting or giving legal advice, . . .may not be used as evidence if they are found
in the hands of the lawyer." Slynn's opinion, id. at 1646.
The six original member states are Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Germany and Italy. See THE EDWARD REPORT, supra note 36, at 6.
7 See supra note 49.
5' See supra note 54.
9 See Charles, supra note 42.
0 For relevant provisions see infra note 68 (Belgium); note 69 (Italy); note 62
(France) and note 76 (Luxembourg).
61 Slynn's opinion, AM & S, 1982 E.C.R., at 1652.
Les m&lecins ...et toutes autres personnes d~positaires par 6tat ou profession ou par
fonctions temporaires ou permanentes, des secrets qu'on leur confie, qui hors le cas oti
la loi les oblige on les autorise A se porter dnonciateurs, auront rv616 ces secrets,
seront punis...
GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., FRENCH LAW 8-33 (1989).
(Doctors ...and all other persons who are in possession by virtue of their status,
profession, or temporary or permanent duties, of secrets confided to them, and who,
except in a case where the law obligates or authorizes them to make reports, reveal
these secrets, shall be punished by imprisonment ...and by a fine. .... )
Article 378 of the French Penal Code makes revealing a secret a crime.
1. Secret professionnel. - En imposant t certaines personnes, sous une sanction plnale,
...si celui qui a requ la confidence d'un secret a toujours le devoir de le garder, la
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A lawyer in France can practice law individually, as a member of a
group or as an assistant to another lawyer or group of lawyers.62 Only
those persons who are avocats "may assist or represent the parties, or
plead (postuler) and argue (plaider) before the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies of any kind whatever."'63 A lawyer who testifies in legal proceed-
ings cannot breach his obligation of secrecy even if asked to give testi-
mony about the secret information.'
In Belgium a general practitioner who can practice in all areas of
law, appear before the tribunals and has a right to plead in court is called
an avocat.' All lawyers in Belgium are "required to be independent, ex-
rav6lation de cette confidence ne le rend punissable que s'il s'agit d'une confidence li~e
a l'exercie de certaines professions; ce que ]a loi a voulu garantir, c'est Ia s6curit6 des
confidences qu'un particulier est dans ]a ncessit6 de faire h une personne dont l'etat
ou la profession, dans un intdret gdn~ral et d'ordre public, fait d'elle un confident
ntcessaire ...
6. Le secret professionnel couvre toutes les confidences que l'avocat a pu recevoir A
raison de son 6tat ou de sa profession.
CODE P NAL, art. 378 (Dalloz 1992-93) (Fr.).
(1. Professional Secret - It is imposed on certain individuals, under the penalty of law
* . . if one who has received a communication to be held in confidence, the revelation
of this confidence will only be punishable if the secret was communicated during a
professional relationship; what the law wants to guarantee is the security of confidences
which a client communicates to a person whose profession, in the general interest or
public order, makes that person a necessary confidant ...
6. Professional secrets include all confidences that a lawyer could receive by reason of
his position or profession.)
"An avocat may practice his profession either individually, or as a member of
a group within an association or within the framework of a civil professional partner-
ship, or as an assistant (collaborateur) or another avocat or group of avocats." Law
No. 71-1130 of December 31, 1971, art. 8 (Fr.).
63 No one who is not an avocat may assist or represent the parties, or plead (postuler)
and argue (plaider) before the courts and quasi-judicial or disciplinary bodies of any
kind whatever subject to the provisions governing the avocats at the Conseil d'Etat and
at the Cour de cassation and the avouds attached to the cours d'appeal.
Id. at art. 4.
64 THE EDWARD REPORT, supra note 36, at 18-19 citing CODE DE PROCtDURE
PNALE, art. 109 (Fr.) which provides that "[a] lawyer duly cited as a witness must
therefore appear, take the oath and answer all questions which can be answered without
violating the professional secret."
6 CONSEIL DES BARREAUX DE LA COMMUNANTE EUROPEENE, CROSS BORDER
PRACrICE COMPENDIUM Belgium-8 (D.M. Donald-Little ed., 1993) [hereinafter CROSS
BORDER PRACrICE COMPENDIUM].
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empt from external control, influence, pressure or support, in the carrying
out of their professional duties."'  The Criminal Code requires that
attorneys "observe complete confidence in respect of all information
relating to clients, which is disclosed to them in the course of their work,
save in so far as they may be specifically directed by the Court to
disclose same."'67 An in-house lawyer is called a juriste d'enterprise and
has "academic qualifications as licentiate or doctor of laws .... He is not
a practising advocate but may advise on legal matters."68
In Italy, lawyers are not permitted to be employees, either in civil
service or in private industry, thus a person trained as a lawyer who
becomes such an employee is no longer a lawyer.' "The law forbids
Id. at Belgium-31.
Art. 437 - La profession d'avocat est incompatible: ...
4- avee les emplois et activitds rrmunrs, publics ou priv~s, a moins qu'ils ne
mettent en p&il ni l'inddpendance de l'avocat ni la dignit6 du barreau.
Art. 444 -Les avocats exercent librement leur minist~re pour la defense de la justice et
de la v~rit6.
Ils doivent s'absentir d'avancer aucun faire grave contre l'honneur et la
rrputation des personnes A moins que la n&cessit6 de la cause ne 'exige et sous
Ia ris~rve des poursuites disciplinaires et de l'application de 'article 445, s'il y
a lieu.
CODE JUDICIARE, arts. 437, 444 (Bruylant Bruxelles, 1993) (Belg.).
(Art. 437 - The lawyering profession does not tolerate: ...
42 employment or paid activities, public or private which imperil the dignity or
independence of the bar.)
(Art. 444 - Lawyers perform their functions for the defense of justice and truth.
Lawyers must refain from impeaching the honor and reputation of clients unless,
the necessity of the cause demands it and under the reservations of the disciplin-
ary guidelines and the application of article 445...)
67 CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 65, at Belgium-37.
Les mrdecins . .. et toutes autres personnes d~positaires, par dtat ou par pro-
fession, des secrets qu'on leur confie, qui, hors le cas oh ils sont appel~s A rendre
trmoignage en justice et celui oh la loi les oblige A faire connaltre ces secrets, les
auront r6vl, seront punis . . . "
CODE P9NAL, art. 458 (Bruylant Bruxelles, 1993) (Belg.).
(Doctors and all other persons who are in possession, by virtue of their status,
profession or temporary or permanent duties, of secrets confided to them and who,
except in the case where the law calls them to testify and obligates them to tell these
secrets, have revealed these secrets will be punished.)
66 CROSS BORDER PRACTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 65, at Belgium-9.
69 Article 3 of the Legal Profession Law (Law of 22 January 1934, No. 36) de-
scribes activities which are incompatible with the professional legal practice of
avvocato. It provides that "any activity as an employee, either as a civil servant or in
private industry [is incompatible] since subordination does not permit the carrying out
of services in an autonomous and independent way as . . . required of an avvocato."
TYRRELL, supra note 46, at 199-200.
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lawyers from giving evidence of the information confided in them by
their clients and entitles them to withhold documents covered by the
doctrine of professional secrecy."7 Protection in civil investigations is
broader than protection in criminal investigations, but documents in the
hands of the client are not protected." The purpose of the privilege
recognized in Italy is to protect the right to a fair trial guaranteed by
Article 24 of the Constitution.72
The law in Luxembourg protects "legal confidences in the hands of
the lawyers, and of the client after proceedings have begun, but little case
law has been produced showing the application of these rules to prac-
tice."'73 As in the other countries, disclosure of a professional secret in
Luxembourg is a criminal offence.74 In-house counsel in Luxembourg are
permitted to give legal advice75 but are not permitted to be members of
the bar.76
70 Slynn's opinion, AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1653.
Whoever, having knowledge, by reason of his position or office, or his profession or
trade, of a secret, discloses it, without just cause, or employs it for his own or
another's benefit, shall be punished, if his act may result in harm, by imprisonment for
up to one year or by a fine of from 12,000 to 200,000 lire. The crime shall be
punishable on complaint of the victim.
CODICE PENALE art. 622 (Italy) in 23 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES, THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 211 (John Delany ed., Edward M. Wise, trans.,
1978).
71 Slynn's opinion, AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1653.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 "Les m~decins . . .et toutes autres personnes d6positaires par dtat ou profession, des
secrets qu'on leur confie, qui, hors le cas oh il sont appel~s i rendre t~moignage en
justice et celui oh Ia loi les oblige 4 faire connaltre ces secrets, les auront rvd16, seront
punis . . . " CODE PtNAL, art. 458 (Bruylant Bruxelles, 1993) (Lux.).
(Doctors and all other persons who are in possession, by virtue of their status, profes-
sion or temporary or permanent duties, of secrets confided to them and who, except in
the case where the law calls them to testify and obligates them to tell these secrets,
have revealed these secrets will be punished.)
75 In-house avocats, being persons who work under a contract of employment with a
firm, company or group of companies, are authorized to give legal advice and generally
do such legal work which is required by the nature of their work or have direct bearing
on the activities of their employer.
TYRRELL, supra note 46, at 219.
76 Certain activities are considered incompatible with membership of the legal profession,
essentially activities which may be in conflict with or adversely prejudice the profes-
sional duties of the member. A number of incompatible occupations and activities are
specified in article I of the Law of 10 August 1991: . . .salaried employee in private
or public sector, director, managing director, or manager of a commercial concern, or
general attorney or agent for an insurance company ...
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In these four countries, a person who is fully trained as a lawyer and
perhaps has been practicing law for many years, cannot be a member of
the bar once he accepts a position as in-house counsel. The assumption
is that it is too difficult to ensure that the in-house lawyer maintain his
independence because he is intimately involved in the corporation. Since
the lawyers might be required or perhaps desire to put the interests of the
corporation ahead of their duties as lawyers and administrators of justice,
these countries do not permit them to be practicing lawyers.
2. Role of In-House Counsel in the EC
The role of in-house counsel in the EC is the same as for in-house
counsel in other countries: "to keep his client advised about the law and
out of trouble, and internal legal advice needs to be in writing no less
than advice from outside counsel."' " However, the laws and rules in
countries which deny the attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel are
based on the assumption that in-house counsel do not have the ability to
remain independent of pressure from the management of the corporation
in the exercise of their role as a lawyer. The ECJ was persuaded by the
argument that "permanent involvement with the activities of one firm and
direct dependence on this firm for their salary ... lead[s] in-house
lawyers to identify themselves with the firm's interests to the detriment
of their independence." 8
Shortly after the ECJ announced its decision in AM & S, the Com-
mission had the opportunity to use the exclusion of in-house counsel from
attorney-client privilege to its advantage. The Commission investigated the
John Deere Company79 and its EC subsidiaries for a possible violation
of Article 85.0 During its investigation the Commission found that some
Id. at 220.
' Forrester, supra note 46, at 83.
7' Christoforou, supra note 6, at 16.
"' John Deere is a Delaware corporation that operates through branches and sub-
sidiaries in several of the Member States of the EC. Commission Decision 8579, art.
85, 1984 O.J. (L 35) 58 [hereinafter John Deere Decision].
o The problem in this case was that John Deere's internal policies made parallel
trading difficult. Parallel trading occurs when the conditions in national markets are
such that it would be cheaper to buy a product in another country and import it to
one's own country. The conditions are affected by policies of the individual countries
and currency fluctuations. John Deere's policies removed the profitability that would oc-
cur if individuals could engage in parallel trading. The complaint was raised by the
National Farmers Union of the United Kingdom because a member was prevented from
obtaining a tractor from an independent John Deere dealer in Belgium. The Commission
visited the Belgium office and took copies of documents relating to cross border sales.
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contracts used by John Deere and its independent dealers contained
clauses which forbid exportation of equipment after purchase." The
Commission concluded that John Deere knew its conduct, including the
export ban, was illegal under both EC and national law. 2 John Deere
had included in its export ban a savings clause which said " . . . as far
as no contrary legal regulation prevents."83 The Commission found that
this clause was insufficient to prevent the contract from being void."
John Deere shows that the Commission will not hesitate to use an
opinion from in-house counsel to the detriment of the company in
competition infringement cases.'
C. Other EC Regulations for Lawyers
In addition to decisions by the Commission and the ECJ about
specific issues on the regulation of lawyers in the EC, lawyers are regu-
lated and guided by the Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European
Community (CCBE Code)86 and the Lawyers Services Directive. One
The Commission received copies of opinions prepared by John Deere's in-house council
and determined that John Deere had acted with knowledge of its infringement, and was
therefore able to impose higher fines. See id. at 59-60.
"I John Deere Decision, supra note 79, at 60.
82 [John] Deere and Company knew that such conduct, and, in particular, the contractual
export ban, was contrary to EEC and national competition law. It was advised of this
by its in-house counsel. Senior management of [John] Deere and Company in Moline,
including a member of the main board, was fully informed.
Id. at 61.
3 Id. at 62.
94 However, the Commission holds that such an article constitutes an export ban in spite
of this saving clause; the article is worded to read as if exporting is forbidden and im-
posed without explanation or negotiation by a company that ought to know the law on
a multitude of small dealers; such dealers are less likely to know the law and unlikely,
in the circumstances, to consult a lawyer.... [John] Deere's own in-house counsel
expressed doubts as to the legitimacy of such a device.
Id.
9s It seems that the in-house lawyers made a valiant effort to advise their client on com-
plex and rapidly developing points of EEC law, which advice management can find
difficult and expensive to accept. To have this opinion used afterwards as an admission
against the interest of their client/employer, must have been painful indeed. How can it
be that good advice by in-house counsel can later serve as ammunition for the Commis-
sion?
Burkard, supra note 1, at 681.
On October 28, 1988, the EC
adopted a common Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community as a
framework of principles of professional conduct to be applied to all cross-border
activities between lawyers in the EEC, including all professional contacts with lawyers
of Member States (and other signatories) other than their own, and also to the profes-
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of the goals of the CCBE Code is to minimize problems that lawyers
face because they are governed by laws and rules in their own country
and in the EC.8" However, the decision of AM & S automatically causes
problems for in-house counsel in states where they are permitted to
practice law, because in their own country their communications will be
covered by the attorney-client privilege, but in EC matters their communi-
cations will not be privileged. This result will make it difficult for in-
house counsel who remain members of the bar to work effectively in EC
matters because they will have to be aware that if an investigation or suit
arises their communications will not be privileged.89
Under the CCBE Code, lawyers from one country practicing in
another country are required to obey the laws of their home country and
when possible, the laws of the host country.' The CCBE Code also has
sional activities of lawyers in a Member State other than their own.
John Toulmin, A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics?, 15 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 673 (1992). The CCBE Code was adopted by the 12 Member States and six
observer countries (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Norway, Sweden & Switzerland). ADAM-
SON, supra note 23, at 72.
' Council Directive 77/249, art. 57-66, 1977 O.J. (L78) 17 [hereinafter Lawyers
Services Directive].
1. Preamble .... 1.3.1 The continued integration of the European Community and the
increasing frequency of the cross-border activities of lawyers within the Community have
made necessary in the public interest the statement of common rules which apply to all
lawyers from the Community whatever Bar or Law Society they belong to in relation
to their cross-border practice. A particular purpose of the statement of those rules is to
mitigate the difficulties which result from the application of 'double deontology' as set
out in Art. 4 of EC Directive 77/249 of 22 March 1977.
ADAMSON, supra note 23, at app. 5, xlv-xlvi.
' This result will cause problems for in-house counsel who remain members of the
bar when dealing with EC matters similar to those that would arise if the privilege did
not exist at all. These lawyers will be forced to rely more heavily on oral communica-
tions. The result may be a lower quality of legal representation because the parties in-
volved will hesitate to put things in writing if the writings are discoverable. The
situation would be analogous to a refusal to recognize the work-product doctrine in the
U.S. One court stated that if attorneys' work product was not protected,
much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's
thoughts, heretofore inviolate would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and the preparation of
cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the inter-
ests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
9' "Article 4 does, on the whole, proceed on the basis that a lawyer remains sub-
ject to his home rules when carrying on professional activities in a host state. Host
rules are only applied to their full extent to activities relating to legal proceedings or
before public authorities." ADAMSON, supra note 23, at 66.
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provisions which govern confidentiality,9 independence,' demeanor
toward the court93 and prohibition of false or misleading information.'
The goal of the CCBE is to have all the Member States modify their
rules of conduct so that they are harmonious with the CCBE Code and
eventually to implement the CCBE Code for dealings with non-Member
States.95
There have been many criticisms of the decision by the ECJ to
exclude in-house counsel from the attorney-client privilege in countries
where the in-house lawyers remain bound by the rules of the bar.96
Critics argue that these attorneys may be as independent and free from
Article 4 of the Lawyers Services Directive provides: "2. A lawyer pursuing these
activities shall observe the rules of professional conduct of the host Member State,
without prejudice to his obligations of the Member State from which he comes."
Lawyers Services Directive, supra note 87.
9' 2.3 Confidentiality; 2.3.1 It is of the essence of a lawyer's function that he should be
told by his client things which the client would not tell to others, and that he should
be the recipient of other information on a basis of confidence. Without the certainty of
confidentiality there cannot be trust. Confidentiality is therefore a primary right and duty
of the lawyer.
ADAMSON, supra note 23, at app. 5, xlvii.
92 2.1 Independence; 2.1.1. The many duties to which a lawyer is subject require his
absolute independence, free from all other influence, especially such as may arise from
his personal interests or external pressure. Such independence is as necessary to trust in
the process of justice as the impartiality of the judge. A lawyer must therefore avoid
any impairment of his independence and be careful not to compromise his professional
standards in order to please his client, the court or third parties.
Id. at app. 5, xlvii.
" "4.3 Demeanour in court. A lawyer shall while maintaining due respect and
courtesy towards the court defend the interests of his client honourably and in a way
which he considers will be to the client's best advantage within the limits of the law."
Id. at app. 5, lii.
9 "4.4 False or misleading information. A lawyer shall never knowingly give false
or misleading information to the court." Id.
' The organisations representing the legal profession through the CCBE propose that
the rules codified in the following articles . . . be taken into account in all revisions
of national rules of deontology or professional practice with a view to their progressive
harmonisation." Id. at app. 5, xlvi. "It is also hoped that the code will be acceptable
to the legal professions of other non-member states in Europe and elsewhere so that it
could also be applied in the same way between them and the Member States. Id. at
app. 5, lvi.
9 "[I]n my opinion he is to be treated for present purposes in the same way as
lawyers in private practice, so long as he is acting as a lawyer." Slynn's opinion, AM
& S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1655. See also Duffy, supra note 8, at 582; Sandy Ghandi, Legal
Professional Privilege in European Community Law, 7 EUR. L. REV. 308, 313 (1982);
Vollmer, supra note 50, at 17; Christoforou, supra note 6, at 17 n.53.
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influence in their decision making from their clients as non-employed
lawyers. However, the ECJ determined independence by looking at the
legal relationship rather than the actual relationship between the lawyer
and the client.97 The ECJ's refusal to analyze the underlying facts, and
determine what relationship an in-house lawyer has with his client before
removing his right to the attorney-client privilege seems unwise."8 Since
the purpose and acceptance of the attorney-client privilege is widely
acknowledged, the ECJ should have been more careful in determining that
in-house counsel who are still members of the bar, subject to its rules
and discipline, and required to be independent from their clients are not
worthy of that right."
III. THE RULES OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S.
Attorney-client privilege"ro has been recognized in the U.S. since
9' "As criterion for determining the lawyer's degree of independence the Court thus
preferred the legal (absence of a relationship of employment) to the actual (professional
conscience) relationship between lawyer and client." Christoforou, supra note 6, at 16.
98 In seeking to substantiate its preference the Court resorts to the rules of professional
ethics and discipline which it considers to constitute the counterpart of confidentiality.
However, this plainly highlights the contradictions in its reasoning. The two Advocates-
General (and almost everyone else who has voiced an opinion on the judgment) were
unanimous in their view that legal privilege should also extend to in-house lawyers
where they continue to be members of the appropriate lawyers' societies or bars and are
subject to the rules of professional ethics and discipline.
Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted).
The writer does not suggest that the EC engage in a case-by-case analysis of the
independence of in-house counsel of each company in the EC. Rather, she suggests that
the EC carefully investigate the relationships and independence of in-house counsel in
general in the EC to determine whether in-house counsel in general can remain as
independent as non-in-house lawyers. There are many reasons to believe that inde-
pendent attorneys are equally dependent on their relationship with their client, and just
as easily influenced by the demands of the client. See infra notes 196-99 and accompa-
nying text.
99 Perhaps it would also be appropriate for the four Member States that do not
permit in-house counsel to be members of the bar to reconsider whether the actions of
in-house counsel in their countries are not independent because of the relationship of
employment or, instead, because they are no longer permitted to be members of the
bar.
"0 The attorney-client privilege in the U.S. is found in Federal Rule of Evidence
501 which states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience.
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1888101 and for in-house counsel, since at least 19 15 ."° The main is-
sues in the U.S. are 1) who exactly is the client and 2) how far should
the privilege be extended. 3 Recognition of the attorney-client privilege
is a policy choice that acknowledges that the seeking of legal advice is
important although it may make finding the truth somewhat more dif-
ficult." The justifications for the existence of the attorney-client privi-
lege are similar to the justifications espoused by the EC and its Member
States. 5 However, there is debate in the U.S. whether the justifications
for privileged communications between an attorney and his client are as
forceful when the client is a corporation or when the attorney is in-house
counsel."°
FED. R. EvID. 501.
The Supreme Court interpreted this law in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
51 (1980) and said "the lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and
counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if
the professional mission is to be carried out." According to Professor Wigmore a
communication is privileged if the following eight-part test is met.
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confi-
dence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure
by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
'o' See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
'- See United States v. Louisville & N. R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
"o These questions are beyond the scope of this Note. However, several tests have
been created by the courts to determine to whom the privilege should be extended. A
good overview of these tests can be found in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389-394 (1981) and Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client:
Where Do We Go After Upjohn? 81 MICH L. REv. 665, 668-691 (1983) [hereinafter
Michigan Note]. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp.
483, 485 (E.D. Pa), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. for a more
complete discussion of the control group test. See, e.g., Diversified Indus. Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) for a more complete discussion of
the subject matter test.
"4 Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Corporate and Related
Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFsTRA L. REV. 279, 283
(1984).
" See supra notes 28-29, 37-38 and accompanying text.
106 See, e.g., Radiant Burners Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D.
I11. 1962), rev'd 320 F.2d. 314 (7th Cir. 1963); Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn:
The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 473-
81 (1987).
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Attorneys in the U.S. are governed by the rules and codes of con-
duct of their states. The rules for in-house counsel are generally the same
as the rules for lawyers practicing on their own, for the government or in
firms.0 7 The issue in the U.S. is not whether in-house counsel should
be allowed to exercise the attorney-client privilege, but rather who in a
particular company should be included in that protection. Although the
rules differ somewhat by jurisdiction,' 8 all attorneys have an obligation
to maintain the confidences of their clients.'" There are exceptions to
the general rules that in some cases allow and in other cases require the
attorney to disclose the confidential information."' The rules are intend-
"o The obligation of confidentiality is the same for in-house counsel as for indepen-
dent lawyers. Sara A. Corello, Note, In-House Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory
Discharge, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 389, 411 n.126 (1992) citing Doe v. A. Corp., 709
F.2d 1043, 1046-48 (5th Cir. 1983); Coleman v. American Broadcasting Cos., 106
F.R.D. 201, 206 (D.D.C. 1985); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 601 (N.D. Tex.
1981); Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 635-36 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
Government lawyers are subject to additional special provisions. See, e.g., MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT, Rule 1.11, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 (1992) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-103, DR 8-101 (1983)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE].
,os Compare MODEL RULES with MODEL CODE. Versions of the Model Rules were
adopted in more than 35 states and the District of Columbia by the fall of 1992. Some
states have incorporated portions of the Model Rules into the Code previously adopted.
In adopting the Rules or the Code, the states often change the text, sometimes in
significant ways depending on their view of the appropriate scope of the lawyer-client
relationship. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS x (1993). Although it is recognized that the differences in
the rules adopted by the states may be significant, this Note uses the Model Rules and
the Model Code as the basis for comparison.
" In Model Code jurisdictions attorneys are governed by Canon 4 which states that
"[a] Lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." MODEL CODE,
supra note 107, at Canon 4. A "'Confidence' refers to information protected by attor-
ney-client privilege under applicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained
in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the
client." Id. at DR 4-101 (A).
In Model Rules jurisdictions attorneys are governed by Rule 1.6 which states that
"(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized
in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)." MODEL
CODE, supra note 107, at Rule 1.6
,,o The most important exceptions are those enacted to prevent a future crime or to
prevent false evidence being presented to the courts. In Model Code jurisdictions:
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ed to prevent an attorney (whether independent or in-house) from using
their duty/right of confidentiality to obstruct justice, either for personal
gain or because of demands by the client.
A. The Upjohn Case
The leading case in the U.S. discussing the availability of the
attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel is Upjohn Co. v. United
States.' After a letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), an investigation of Upjohn began."'
[a] lawyer may reveal: (1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or cli-
ents affected, but only after full disclosure to them. (2) Confidences or secrets when
permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order. (3) The intention
of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. (4)
Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or
his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
MODEL CODE, supra note 107, at DR 4-101 (C).
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: . . . (5) Knowingly make a
false statement of law or fact. (6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence
when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false. (7) Counsel or assist his
client in conduct that the lawyers knows to be illegal or fraudulent. (8) Knowingly en-
gage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule.
Id. at DR 7-102 (A).
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) His client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall
promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable
to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication.
Id. at DR 7-102 (B).
In a Model Rules jurisdiction,
[a] lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer be-
lieves is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or (2) to
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer....
MODEL RULES, supra note 107, at Rule 1.6 (b).
A lawyer also has a duty of candor toward the tribunal.
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law
to a tribunal; (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client; . . . (4) offer
evidence the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyers shall take reasonable remedial measures. (b)
The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and
apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6.
Id. at Rule 3.3.
. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
"' In Upjohn, Mr. Gerard Thomas, General Counsel for Upjohn, learned from ac-
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In connection with the investigation, Upjohn refused to produce some of
the documents demanded by the IRS,"' claiming that they were protect-
ed from disclosure by attorney-client privilege and the work product doc-
trine. 1
14
In reaching its decision that the documents demanded, including the
written questionnaire and its answers, were protected, the Court briefly
reviewed the history of and justifications behind the development of the
attorney-client privilege and Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The Court
said that the purpose of privilege is to encourage the "communication of
relevant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to
render legal advice to the client corporation."".5 Only by allowing unin-
hibited communication with attorneys can the public interest in justice be
served."6 Furthermore, the Court recognized that, although the commu-
nication was protected, the underlying facts were not."7 The decision
countants working for the corporation that one of Upjohn's foreign subsidiaries had
been making payments to foreign governments to secure government business. Mr.
Thomas discussed the situation with the Chairman of the Board and an investigation of
the "questionable payments" was started. A letter and questionnaire were sent to "All
Foreign General and Area Managers" requesting information about the payments and
stating that the investigation was to be considered "highly confidential." In March 1976,
Upjohn submitted a Form 8-K to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disclosing the questionable payments. The IRS began an
investigation and issued a summons on November 23, 1976, demanding production of
documents.
113 The IRS summons demanded "production of '[a]ll files relative to the investi-
gation conducted under the supervision of Gerard Thomas [identifying] payments to
employees of foreign governments."' Id. at 387-88. The summons went on to state that
"[t]he records should include but not be limited to written questionnaires sent to
managers of the Upjohn Company's foreign affiliates and memorandums or notes of the
interviews conducted in the U.S. and abroad with officers and employees of Upjohn
Company and its subsidiaries." Id.
"' The work product doctrine protects attorneys' work prepared in anticipation of
litigation. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
..5 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
16 A lawyer needs to have full and frank communications with his client in order
to "promote [the] broader public interest [ ] in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client." Id. at 389.
17 [T]he protection of privilege extends only to communications and not to facts. A fact
is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The
client ...may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely
because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.
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did not question the proposition that in-house counsel should be entitled
to the same attorney-client privilege as other lawyers.
The Upjohn case gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to explain
clearly why and to what extent the attorney-client privilege should apply
to corporations and to in-house counsel specifically; unfortunately, it did
not."' Cases heard in lower courts have recognized that the attorney-
client privilege is available to in-house attorneys, but do not agree on the
scope of the privilege. 9 Although the Supreme Court did not clearly
explain and justify its recognition of the availability of the attorney-client
privilege to in-house counsel, it is a well-settled point of law.'
B. Justifications for the Attorney-Client Privilege
There are two major justifications for the existence of the attorney-
client privilege. The justification referred to in Upjohn is the traditional
justification for attorney-client privilege; that the best administration of
justice can only occur when clients can have full and frank communica-
tions with their lawyers.'' The other justification for attorney-client
Id. at 395-396, citing Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830,
831.
I; when the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear Upjohn Company v. United
States, scholars and practitioners alike took note. For decades, the Court had accepted
tacitly the proposition that the attorney-client privilege available to individuals also was
available to corporations, but it never had delineated the scope and meaning of the
corporate attorney-client privilege. . . . Upjohn provided an opportunity for the Supreme
Court both to explain its willingness to extend to corporations a privilege originally
designed for individuals and to define precisely the scope and meaning of the corporate
privilege. The Upjohn Court allowed the opportunity to pass, however.
John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 57 N.Y.U.L. REV. 443, 443-44 (1982).
"' The only case which refused to recognize the attorney-client privilege for a
corporation was reversed on appeal. Radiant Burners Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207
F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F. 2d. 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
" See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 397; Natta v. Hogan, 392
F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968); Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del.
1975) citing Burlington Indus. v. Exxon, 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974); Lee Nat'l Corp.
v. Deramus, 313 F. Supp. 224 (D. Del 1970); Malco Mfg. Co. v. Elco Corp., 45
F.R.D. 24 (D. Minn. 1968); Sperti Products Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., 262 F. Supp. 148
(D. Del. 1966).
", This justification will be called the traditional justification for purposes of this
Note. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1981); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976), Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888), United States v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915), Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 210 F. Supp 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied
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privilege is based on the notions of privacy and autonomy of the client
in determining who should have access to his information." Several
critics suggest that the attorney-client privilege should not be extended to
situations where the client is a corporation, or where the attorney is in-
house counsel.
1. The Traditional Justification
Professor Wigmore in his treatise on evidence traced the existence of
the attorney-client privilege back to the reign of Elizabeth I. The
justification is based on the utilitarian argument that, to promote freedom
of consultation with legal advisers, the law must prohibit "disclosure
except on the client's consent."'
24
The traditional justification for the attorney-client privilege recognizes
that the legal world is complex and that it is unreasonable to assume that
the best administration of justice can occur without assistance to those
before the courts."2 Individuals being represented by attorneys will not
sub nom.
,"' See Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications: I. Modes of Analy-
sis: The Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv.
1471, 1480-83 (1985) [hereinafter Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communica-
tions].
" See id. at 1471-80; Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing,
and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464-473 (1977) [hereinafter Fixed
Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement]; WIGMORE, supra note 100, § 2290,
at 542.
Initially the privilege existed because of the "oath and the honor" of an attorney;
it was considered "[tihe first duty of the attorney ... to keep the secrets of his
clients." Id. at 543. By the 1700's the justification for privilege changed and became
based on the notion that it was necessary to provide "subjectively for the client's
freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser" and it was "proposed to assure
this by removing the risk of disclosure by the attorney even at the hands of the law."
Id.
124 WIGMORE, supra note 100, § 2291.
Wigmore concludes that the four fundamental conditions for communication to be
privileged are met in the attorney-client situation.
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory mainte-
nance of the relation between the parties. 3) The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 4) The injury that would
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. Only if these four conditions
are present should a privilege be recognized.
Id. § 2285.
"2 See also Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications: III. Attorney-
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be willing to be as forthcoming with potentially relevant information if
they believe that the attorney might be required at a later time to reveal
that information. Furthermore, non-lawyers cannot function efficiently or
effectively in the adversary system without assistance of counsel and
because individuals need to seek advice on the law and its complexities
to function within the system.'26 If individuals do seek legal assistance
and conform with the laws, the benefits of this legally correct behavior
will flow to society.
Certainty in determining whether communications are privileged is
essential for the objective of encouraging communication to occur.'27
Clients will be candid if they are certain that their communications will
not be disclosed.' If the professional knows that he might be forced to
disclose communications, he may be hesitant to aggressively solicit
information from his client.'29 Behavior modification of the client will
Client Privilege, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (1985) [hereinafter Attorney-Client
Privilege].
As matters become complex, lay persons will have no choice but to consult the experts.
The threat of being sued or the need to sue for redress of grievances necessarily drives
clients to lawyers. When litigation is not involved, the inability to understand or deal
with a legal matter is usually the catalyst.
Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 364 (1989). "By
encouraging clients to communicate information they would otherwise withhold from
their lawyers, confidentiality enhances the quality of legal representation and thus helps
produce accurate legal verdicts." Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
'" The legal system is very complex and it is unreasonable to assume that indi-
viduals will be able to operate within the restrictions without assistance. 'The multitude
have not leisure for profoundly studying the laws: they do not possess the capacity for
connecting together distant regulations - they do not understand the technical terms of
arbitrary and artificial methods." Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 125, at 1506 n.37
(1985) citing J. BENTHAM, A GENERAL VIEW OF A COMPLETE CODE OF LAWS, in 3
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 161 (J. Bowring ed. 1843).
'27 Courts, recognizing the need for certainty have refused to engage in a case-by-
case balancing test of the need for privilege and the harm from non-disclosure. See,
e.g., Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, supra note 123, at 468 cit-
ing Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84
HARV. L. REV. 424, 429 (1970); Saltzburg, supra note 104, at 281.
" "Attorneys and corporate actors must have rules of sufficient clarity so that they
can predict with confidence which communications will be privileged and which will
not be. In the absence of such predictability, the corporate privilege may not act to
induce any increment in communication with corporate counsel." Sexton, supra note
118, at 482. See also Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, supra
note 123, at 469.
' The problem with this result is that the best administration of justice could not
occur because the attorney will be hesitant to encourage the client to communicate free-
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only result if the existence and application of the rule of attorney-client
privilege are certain and predictable. 3' Courts have recognized that the
privilege hinders the discovery of the truth and therefore should not be
broadly construed.'
There are many criticisms of privilege, particularly of the underlying
assumption that privilege increases communication. "Critics of an existing
privilege commonly assert that people typically know little or nothing
about their privilege and that, even if they did, the knowledge would
rarely alter their communicative behavior."'3 Unfortunately the little
empirical data available that either supports or refutes the assumptions
underlying the need to protect confidentiality is not conclusive. 33
ly with him. Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, supra note 122,
at 1476-77. "If an attorney cannot promise to maintain the confidentiality of his client's
communications, the only advice he or she could provide to the client would be 'Don't
talk to me."' Samaritan Found. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of Ariz., 173 Ariz. 426 (Ct of
Appeals Div. 1, Dept E 1992) citing, Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n,
784 P.2d 1373, 1375-1376 (Cal. 1990).
" Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at
1486-87.
If there is not certainty of privilege, clients will not be as open and honest with
attorneys and the best administration of justice will not occur. "Society would surely
suffer greatly if the lack of a privilege discouraged clients from conferring with their
doctors, informants from talking to reporters, and spouses from sharing intimacies." Id.
at 1473. See also Zacharias, supra note 125, at 364.
"[A]dvice is more likely to produce appropriate corporate behavior if based on full
disclosure of the facts rather than incompleteness, half-truths and distortions prompted
by the apprehension of revelation in litigation." Vincent Alexander, The Corporate At-
torney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191, 222
(1989).
1 Nevertheless, the privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its
benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete. . . . It is
worth preserving for the sake of general policy, but it is nonetheless an obstacle to the
investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle.
WIGMORE, supra note 100, § 2291, at 554 citing Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.)
89, 97 (1831).
"Courts and scholars recognize that it also imposes costs on the judicial system by
keeping relevant evidence from the fact finder. Consequently, the privilege is not
absolute and its requirements are strictly construed." Steven M. Abramowitz, Note,
Disclosure Under the Securities Laws: Implications for the Attorney-Client Privilege, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 456, 458 (1990) (citations omitted).
132 Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at
1474.
"' "Well-respected scholars have also noted the lack of empirical evidence estab-
lishing its practical effectiveness. Yet no new studies have been conducted in response.
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At least two of the studies conducted on the issue of attorney-client
privilege have concluded that people seeking legal advice may misunder-
stand the privilege. An early study conducted at Yale University' con-
cluded that lay peoples' understanding of the attorney-client privilege was
erroneous in many cases and that it was more important to the attorneys
than the clients.'35 Fred C. Zacharias completed a study'36 in which he
found that clients had some misunderstanding about confidentiality, but
that a substantial number had relied on confidentiality when giving in-
formation to their attorneys.'37
Another study, conducted by Professor Vincent Alexander at St.
John's Law School' concluded that in most cases attorney-client privi-
lege does encourage candid communications between management and
attorneys.'39 Alexander's study also showed that there was a difference
in the perceptions of in-house and independent counsel about the ability
of the attorney-client privilege to increase candor of employees. Although
fewer in-house counsel said that the privilege increases communications
and candor,'" a significant number still felt it was important. Prof.
Most commentators continue simply to assert the essential nature of strict confidentiality
to our legal system." Zacharias, supra note 125, at 376 (citations omitted). See also
Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at 1474;
Michigan Note, supra note 103, at 665 n.2.
'1 This study was a survey using a questionnaire of "judges, lawyers, accountants,
marriage counselors, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers and laymen." Comment,
Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for
the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1226-27 (1962).
" "Lawyers significantly more than laymen, believe the privilege encourages free
disclosure to them. . . . In fact, . . .most people were either unaware of the attorney-
client privilege or believed that it extended to other professional relationships as well."
Id. at 1232.
'" Zacharias, supra note 125, at 379-80 (Mr. Zacharias recognized that there were
substantial limitations to the information and conclusions drawn from his study because
of the limited number and geographic area of the respondents. All (63 active lawyers,
42 non-lawyers) lived in Tompkins County, New York which is a rural area and influ-
enced by the near-by presence of Cornell University.
'" Id. at 380-81. He said that although his study was not conclusive, it seems that
a less strict confidentiality standard might provide benefits to the justice system that
outweigh costs associated with them. Id. at 355.
138 Alexander, supra note 130, at 193. This study was based on 182 interviews with
corporate attorneys, corporate management, federal judges and magistrates.
131 "[The corporate attorney-client privilege, despite lingering doubts, may perform
a useful function by enhancing candid disclosure between attorneys and corporate
management. For this reason, and because of its potential contribution to corporate legal
compliance, it is worthy of continued recognition in most circumstances." Id. at 200.
140 Id. at 276.
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Alexander's findings did not lead to the conclusion that the privilege
should be taken away from in-house counsel. 41
Professor Steven Shavell of Harvard Law School created a model to
determine what influence confidentiality has on decisions to obtain
advice. 4 2 His model did not differentiate between in-house and indepen-
dent attorneys in its attempt to predict clients' behavior in the face of
confidentiality. 4
3
Legal advice can only lead to two types of changes in behavior: to a
party's committing an act that is not sanctionable and that he would not
otherwise have committed (because he erroneously thought it likely to
be sanctionable) or to a party's not committing a sanctionable act that
he would otherwise have committed (because he erroneously thought it
unlikely to be sanctionable). Both these types of changes in behavior are
socially desirable."4
He concluded that in different situations, confidentiality will have differ-
ent effects on whether a party seeks advice; 45 but that the main advan-
4, Alexander cited three reasons why the attorney-client privilege should remain for
conversations with in-house counsel. I) Although in-house counsel was less enthusiastic,
62% still believed it increased candor. 2) The samples surveyed were very small. 3)
"Abolition might resurrect an unhealthy class distinction in the legal profession." Id.
142 "A party will obtain legal advice if its expected value exceeds its cost. The
expected value of advice is determined by the probability that advice will lead a party
to alter his behavior, multiplied by the benefit he will obtain from his altered behav-
ior." Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain
Advice, Its Social Desirability, And Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
123, 127 (1988).
"' He differentiated between types of legal advice that include advice concerning the
legality of acts, advice concerning the probability or magnitude of sanction, and advice
instructing parties how to lower the probability or magnitude of sanctions. He assumes
for purposes of his model that parties make decisions based on the expected values of
the actions and that parties are risk neutral. Id. at 124-25. "[The value to a party of
protection of confidentiality inheres in the possibility that, after he obtains advice, he
will decide to commit an act for which he might be sanctioned." Id. at 137.
Id. at 129.
'4 Type I: Advice about the sanctionability of acts.
Where definitive advice about the sanctionability of an act is possible, confi-
dentiality will have no effect on the parties' decision to obtain advice. Id. at 130.
Where advice about sanctionability is not definitive, parties will still tend to obtain
legal advice about the sanctionability. The advice given will be included in the client's
calculation of whether to commit the questionable act. The social desirability of protec-
tion of confidentiality in this case depends on whether the expected sanctions are great-
er than or less than the harm done by the acts. Id. at 132-34.
Type II: Advice about the Magnitude of Probability of Sanctions
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tage of confidentiality "is that more individuals will discuss their plans
with attorneys and then may decide against acting. ' 46
Although the results of these studies do not lead to a clear answer,
it seems that more support is found in these studies and discussions for
continuing the attorney-client privilege than for abandoning it. Assuming
it is at least possible and perhaps even probable that the attorney-client
privilege increases communication between the attorney and his client,
and the communication may lead to behavior modification, it seems
necessary to continue to recognize it. If behavior modification is possible,
and even likely in certain situations as Professor Shavell suggests, then
extending the attorney-client privilege to all attorneys should cause the
greatest amount of law-abiding behavior by clients, which in the long run
will be beneficial to society.
2. The Privacy Rationale
The other major justification is based on the idea that the attorney-
client privilege protects individual privacy and autonomy. There is a need
for protection of personal autonomy because individuals should be able to
control whether information about their communications is released or not
and to whom. 7 The privacy interest of an individual is sufficient to
override any "impairment of truth-seeking that privileges may cause." '
This justification for the attorney-client privilege relies on three
values to give it strength: "human autonomy regarding personal informa-
tion, respect for relationships, and respect for the bonds and promises that
protect shared information." '149 If an individual tells his attorney some-
If expected sanctions are equal to or greater than the harmfulness of the act, pro-
tection of confidentiality will lead to socially desirable changes in behavior. Id. at 134-
36
Type I: Advice to those wishing to lower the probability or magnitude of
sanctions
Protection of confidentiality in this situation is socially undesirable because it will
assist individuals in engaging in socially undesirable behavior. Id. at 136-37.
'4 Id. at 143.
147 "The other justification ...would privilege attorney-client communications ...
because compelled disclosure of attorney-client communications is itself intrinsically
wrong in certain circumstances." Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 125, at 1501
(citation omitted).
14' Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at
1480-81.
141 SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHIcs OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 120
(1982).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L[
thing with the expectation that it will not be disclosed and for some
reason the attorney must disclose it, two distinct harms can occur: "(1)
embarrassment of having secrets revealed to the public and (2) the forced
breach of an entrusted confidence."'5° These harms are very real to the
person whose secret has been revealed and will have a chilling effect on
others who may desire to seek assistance of counsel.
C. Applying Attorney-Client Privilege To Corporations
Three main criticisms of applying the attorney-client privilege to
situations where the client is a corporation have been raised.' These
arguments can be broken down to 1) the Radiant Burners argument; 2)
the claim that the evidentiary cost is too high; and 3) the claim that it is
illogical and unnecessary to apply the privacy rationale to corporations
and therefore no privilege should attach.5 Despite these counter argu-
ments to the existence of privilege, none have been deemed sufficient to
prevent the application of the privilege to corporations.
These values concern relationships between individuals and the need to have others
respect what is shared with them in confidence. Individuals feel a duty to behave
carefully when another has shared information with a request that it be kept confiden-
tial because an intimate relationship is created between the two. In support of these
three premises, Bok first argues that if people did not maintain secrets no one could
"maintain privacy or guard against danger." Second, it is legitimate to share secrets and
the sharing creates relationships which are intimate. These relationships and the need
to preserve the confidence is "rooted in loyalties." -Third, once people promise to keep
something confidential they are "no longer start[ing] from scratch in weighing the moral
factors of a situation. They matter differently once the promise is given, so that full
impartiality is no longer called for." Id. at 120.
"0 Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at
1481.
"' Although the issue of whether the attorney-client privilege should be involved
when the client is a corporation is not the central focus of this Note, it is useful to
an understanding of the problems involved in extending the privilege to in-house
counsel. If the criticisms of applying it to situations where the corporation is the client
are accepted, then it follows that it should not be extended to in-house counsel either
because the only client is the corporation and the in-house counsel would have no
other dealings to be protected.
2, See supra notes 132-146 and accompanying text (discussing whether the privilege
actually induces increased communications).
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1. Radiant Burners Case 53
Although the Radiant Burners case was reversed on appeal and has
not been followed by any other court, Chief Judge Campbell made a
compelling argument that the attorney-client privilege should not be
extended to corporations. He argued that courts and commentators had
long taken for granted that the attorney-client privilege should be extend-
ed to corporations even though there was no authority for that conclu-
sion." Campbell argued that the attorney-client privilege should not
apply to corporations for two reasons. First, the attorney-client 'privilege
was analogous to the privilege against self-incrimination that can only be
claimed by individuals and not corporations.'55 Since both were created
by common law and their development was so interrelated, Campbell
questioned whether the two were intended to be different privileges.'56
His second argument was that one element underlying the privilege is that
the communication is completely confidential between the client and
attorney. However, in a corporate setting the number of people with
access to the information is greater than if an individual has the informa-
tion, and the likelihood of accidental waiver will increase.'57
The Seventh Circuit overturned Campbell's decision saying "[w]ith
deference to the ingenuity and judicial courage displayed by the district
court in arriving at its conclusions we find ourselves in disagreement with
the broad holding 'that a corporation is not entitled to make claim to the
attorney-client privilege. '" 58 The court noted that the privilege had been
granted to corporations in a large number of cases over the past century
5 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962);
rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
"u "[A] corporation's right to assert the privilege has somewhat generally been taken
for granted by the judiciary, myself included, without a proper reliance on stare decisis
or the promulgation anywhere of record of a clear legal analysis of the issue involved."
Radiant Burners, 207 F. Supp. at 772.
155 The attorney-client privilege, analogous to the privilege against self-incrimination, is
historically and fundamentally personal in nature. Both privileges have their genesis in
common law and both still exist independently of statute .... It logically follows that
this personal privilege of the client must, as in the case of the personal privilege
against self-incrimination, be claimed only by natural individuals and not by mere
corporate entities.
Id. at 773.
"5 "In its historic genesis in the common law it is so intimately entwined with its
great partner the privilege against self-incrimination that a person reading its history
begins to doubt that two separate privileges ever were originally intended." Id. at 775.
7 Id. at 773-74.
" Radiant Burners, 320 F.2d at 318.
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in both the U.S. and England.'59 The court stated that the privilege did
not arise out of respect for the rights of individuals, rather that it was
designed to promote the administration of justice and therefore should be
fully applicable to corporations. 60
2. "Zone of Silence" Criticism
Others have argued that application of the attorney-client privilege in
situations where the client is a corporation is dangerous to the administra-
tion of justice because of the creation of the "zone of silence."'' "A
corporate client could structure its procedures so as to privilege much of
its routine transactions through transmittal to corporate counsel. As one
court noted 'in the corporate context, given the large number of employ-
ees, frequent dealings with lawyers and masses of documents, the "zone
of silence" grows large.""" At first glance something that creates a
"zone of silence" and hinders the evidence gathering process seems
undesirable. However, this argument ignores that even though the
communication may be privileged, the facts that surround the communica-
tion are still discoverable.'63 As the Supreme Court stated, "application
of the attorney-client privilege . . . puts the adversary party in no worse
position than if the communications had never taken place."'6 As long
as the evidence can be obtained, there is no reason to discourage socially
useful communications between lawyers and clients because the lawyer
might be required to reveal communications.
'9 See id. at 319 for an extensive listing of federal, state and English cases
recognizing the right of the attorney-client privilege for corporations.
'60 Id. at 321.
"' There is a "concern that excessively broad corporate privilege would give cor-
porate parties an unwarranted litigation advantage and might permit a considerable
amount of evidence to be concealed under the umbrella of the corporate attorney-client
privilege." Saltzburg, supra note 104, at 288. See also, Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 388-89 (1981); Sexton, supra note 118, at 477; Waldman, supra note
106, at 483; Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 125, at 1507.
'62 Waldman, supra note 106, at 483 (citation omitted).
16 The study conducted at St. John's University stated that most judges believe the
"same information is frequently discoverable in some other form." Alexander, supra
note 130, at 260. See also supra note 131 and accompanying text.
"6 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
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3. Criticism of the Privacy Rational
Some commentators have argued that the need for privacy and
autonomy that may justify the existence of privilege for individuals does
not apply to corporations.'"
The recognition of organizational privacy has been more controver-
sial. Some have treated it as different from but analogous to, individual
privacy; others have viewed privacy as a right that generally attaches
only to individuals. To the extent that privacy is valued for the func-
tions it serves, it appears applicable to organizations. But to the extent
that privacy is valued as an end in itself, it appears inapplicable to
organizations. Nonetheless, because courts can and do justifiably recog-
nize organizational privileges in order to prevent immediate harms, such
as breaches of national security, limiting the privacy rationale to individ-
uals is not a useful approach, despite the fact that the immediate harm
prevented is not strictly a harm to privacy."6
Corporations are not individuals but they are made up of and run by
individuals. It seems unreasonable to believe that individuals can easily
separate their expectations and need for privacy and control over informa-
tion in their personal life from their professional life. Just because a
person is in a corporate setting, his ideas, values and beliefs do not
drastically change such that he finds it appropriate or expects to have
confidential information shared.
Despite the criticisms, it is well-settled that the attorney-client
privilege is extended to situations where the client is a corporation.'67
Although it might be more likely that corporations would seek legal
advice even if there were no attorney-client privilege,'68 the need to
have individuals in the corporation to be open and frank with counsel
remains. It is not difficult to believe that some individuals in a corpora-
tion would be hesitant to come forward with information if they believed
that the information would or could be used against them in the fu-
ture.'69 The criticisms of applying the attorney-client privilege in situa-
"' This justification is more difficult to apply to the grant of the attorney-client
privilege to corporations. See Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications,
supra note 122, at 1480-83; BOK, supra note 149, at 142-43.
'" The Theories and Justifications of Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at
1482 (citations omitted).
'67 See supra notes 158-59.
, Sexton, supra note 118, at 464; Corello, supra note 107, at 418.
,6 Sexton, supra note 118, at 464-65; Corello, supra note 107, at 413-14; Saltzburg,
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tions where the client is a corporation directly affects whether in-house
counsel should be included within the scope of the privilege. If corpora-
tions are not extended the attorney-client privilege, it would be unneces-
sary to decide whether in-house counsel should be included. Communica-
tions with in-house counsel would only occur with a client to which the
protection is not extended, thus saying that in-house counsel are included
in the scope of the attorney-client privilege would be meaningless because
there would be no communications to protect.
IV. SHOULD THE PRIVILEGE BE APPLIED TO IN-HOUSE COUNSEL?
Many companies have decided for a variety of reasons that their
legal needs can be best met if they have one or more attorneys who are
employees of the corporation.'17 The corporation is the only client of
these attorneys. The recognition that the corporation's right to the attor-
ney-client privilege is the same whether the attorney is in-house or
independent is well settled in the U.S. while the non-recognition for in-
house counsel of the privilege in the EC is equally well-settled."' Argu-
ments supporting and attacking the extension of the attorney-client
privilege to in-house counsel will be discussed below.
A. Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not be Available
Generally, critics argue that the privilege should not apply to in-
house counsel for two reasons. First is the argument advanced by the
decision in AM & S; an attorney will be influenced by the business needs
of the company causing his independent professional judgment to be
impaired.' Second, critics say it is difficult to determine when the
attorney is acting as an attorney and when a communication is legal,
however these issues are important because only legal communications
supra note 104, at 283.
In the Tompkins County Study, Zacharias, supra note 125, at 386, "a majority of
lay persons answered that they would withhold information" if a guarantee of confiden-
tiality could not be given.
110 For example, "The staff attorney's position exists also so that business people can
have the benefit of legal advice long before it would be economical to call in outside
talent. Corporate staff attorneys pride themselves on doing preventive law by advising
on the structure of a business deal as it evolves." EvE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE,
SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK 78 (1986). See also supra note 1.
'T See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & N. R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915);
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981). See also Alexander, supra note
130, at 195 n.8. For discussion of the non-recognition of the privilege for in-house
counsel in the EC see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
I" See Charles, supra note 42.
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can be protected.7 3 The attorney-client privilege in the U.S. and the EC
both require the communication to be between an attorney and his client,
with the attorney acting as an attorney. 74 The discussion below explains
why these criticisms are insufficient to prevent the application of the
attorney-client privilege where the attorney is in-house counsel.75
1. Independent Professional Judgment
The first argument against extending the attorney-client privilege to
in-house counsel is that the employment relationship between the attorney
and the company creates a conflict for the attorney because he will be re-
quired to maintain his independent professional judgment while protecting
and advancing the interests of the company. In certain situations these
two obligations will conflict. The concern expressed by critics of an
extension of privilege is that the attorneys will be more concerned with
loyalty to their client and keeping their jobs than fulfilling their responsi-
bilities as lawyers. 76
17 See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 118, at 489; Abramowitz, supra note 131, at 463
and nn. 37-38; Corello, supra note 107, at 417.
171 See supra note 39 (for EC) and infra note 182 (for U.S.) and accompanying text.
,71 This discussion of whether to extend the attorney-client privilege to in-house
counsel assumes that in-house counsel are subject to the same ethical and disciplinary
rules as other attorneys in their country. In situations, such as currently exist in Italy,
France, Belgium and Luxembourg, these arguments do not apply. Persons who have
legal training, but are not acting under the same rules as lawyers to uphold justice and
remain independent from their clients probably will not remain independent and put the
administration of justice first, so withholding the attorney-client privilege from these
persons is sensible. To allow these persons to protect communications would be similar
to allowing general business people to protect communications with other business
people. This situation would not promote the objectives of recognizing the attorney-
client privilege. However, if the in-house counsel in these countries actually do continue
to act like independent lawyers despite the fact that they are not members of the bar,
perhaps these countries should reconsider their decision to exclude them from the bar.
See supra notes 38, 121-22 and accompanying text.
" The problem is that the only recourse from an unlawful demand by the company
is for the lawyer to withdraw from representing it. However, withdrawal from represen-
tation for an in-house lawyer means unemployment.
Due to the scarcity of jobs, those seeking employment cannot afford to turn down
offers regardless of the terms. Individuals already employed cannot easily refuse to work
under particular conditions or to follow an employer's demand. These employees lack
the luxury of being able to move from job to job and their immobility weakens their
bargaining power.
Cathryn Dakin, Protecting Attorneys Against Wrongful Discharge: Extension of the
Public Policy Exception, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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Although it is true that in-house counsel are dependent on their
corporation client for their income and job security,'" it does not neces-
sarily follow that they will be more easily subject to influence. The
Model Rules, the Model Code, and the CCBE Code place a good deal of
importance on the need for a lawyer to maintain certain professional
standards that require him to remain free from being unduly influenced
by his corporation client."' The problem of undue influence by the
17 "[A]n in-house lawyer's relationship to her employer is the same as other em-
ployees in most important respects: She is dependent on her employer for her sole
income, benefits and pension. . . . The employer controls the lawyer's hours and 'the
focus of [in-house counsel's] practice."' Corello, supra note 107, at 405-06 (citation
omitted).
,78 Under the Model Code certain situations are set forth in which a lawyer may or
must withdraw from employment. For example, a lawyer must withdraw if "[hie knows
or it is obvious that his client is bringing a legal action, conducting the defense, or
asserting a position in the litigation, or is otherwise having steps taken for him merely
for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person" or if "[hie knows or
it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary
Rule." MODEL CODE, supra note 107, at DR 2-110(B)(1), (2). Thus a lawyer whose
client is attempting to use the lawyer to break the law must withdraw from employ-
ment because the activity would be a violation of DR 7-102 (a lawyer must represent
his "client within the bounds of the law.").
Furthermore, Canon 5 states that "[a] lawyer should exercise independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of a client." MODEL CODE, supra note 107, at Canon 5.
A lawyer must avoid "even the appearance of impropriety." Although this is not
an exhaustive examination of the Model Code provisions governing the behavior of
lawyers and the requirement that they act within the bounds of the law it is sufficient
to make the point that although in-house counsel may be dependent on the corporation
for their job and their salary, they are still required to behave under the same rules as
other attorneys. MODEL CODE, supra note 107, at DR 9-101.
A similar observation can be made in jurisdictions observing the Model Rules.
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent, but may discuss the legal consequences of any
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
MODEL RULEs, supra note 107, at 1.2(d).
The EC provisions of the CCBE Code require attorneys to remain independent and
free from influence of their clients.
2.1 Independence
2.1.1 The many duties to which a lawyer is subject require his absolute independence,
free from all other influence, especially such as may arise from his personal interests
or external pressure. Such independence is as necessary to trust in the process of justice
as the impartiality of the judge. A lawyer must therefore avoid any impairment of his
independence and be careful not to compromise his professional standards in order to
please his client, the court or third parties.
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business people is generally diffused by the fact that corporate legal
departments are segregated from the rest of the company "to protect not
only the autonomy of the law department . . . [and] the corporation's
long-term interest in having its executives' business practices adequately
monitored."' 79 It is not clear that situations where attorneys are pres-
sured to go against their judgment because of corporate pressure are
common."' For these reasons, it is unlikely that charges that in-house
counsel are more easily corrupted or influenced by their client than
independent counsel are valid.
2. Protecting Only "Legal" Communications
The second criticism is that in-house counsel are often intimately
involved in all the company's affairs and therefore it may be difficult to
determine whether a communication is legal or business and therefore
whether the privilege should apply. U.S. courts have dealt with this
problem in different ways, but it does appear possible to distinguish
between legal and non-legal advice and to prevent the privilege from
applying where it should not.' As with any other attempt to claim that
communications are privileged, a conversation with in-house counsel will
only be protected if it is "legal" in nature." 2 Despite the difference in
2.1.2 This independence is necessary in non-contentious matters as well as in litigation.
Advice given by a lawyer to his client has no value if it is given only to ingratiate
himself, to serve his personal interest or in response to outside pressure.
ADAMSON, supra note 23, at app. 5, xlvii (1992).
"Unlike other employees, in-house attorneys are not forced to choose between
violating the law and losing their job because violating the law is not an option for
those bound by the ethical codes." Corello, supra note 107, at 403 (citation omitted).
'79 SPANGLER, supra note 170, at 76.
"s "On-balance, in-house counsel maintain that situations seldom arise in which they
are pressured to compromise their professional judgment." Id. at 99.
" The specific requirements and tests used by courts differ but the result has been
that non-legal advice has generally not been protected. See Sexton, supra note 118, at
489 n.149, for a listing of cases refusing to accord privilege to non-legal advice. See
also Abramowitz, supra note 131, at 463 and nn.37-38; Corello, supra note 107, at 418
n.174.
18 "[P]rivilege and confidentiality only apply to those acting as attorneys." Corello,
supra note 107, at 417 (citations omitted). See also Abramowitz, supra note 131, at
462:
The attorney-client privilege is applicable only to a client's communications of legal
matters to the attorney because these are the communications that the privilege assumes
might not be made absent a privilege. Consequently, if a communication is made for
business purposes rather than as a request for legal advice, or if the attorney is acting
in a role other than that of lawyer, the privilege does not apply.
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the relationship between in-house and independent attorneys and their cli-
ents, since only legal conversations are privileged, there will be no
additional evidentiary cost to the adverse party than if the client had
retained independent counsel.
B. Attorney-Client Privilege Should Be Available
There are four main arguments why in-house counsel should be
given the attorney-client privilege, and the decision of the ECJ should be
reversed or at least modified to protect communication with certain in-
house attorneys. First, in-house counsel may actually be in a better
position than independent lawyers to encourage lawful behavior by the
client and the administration of justice by having more influence over the
officers and directors of the company. Second, lawyers in firms may not
actually be more independent than in-house lawyers. Third, if the attor-
neys are subject to the same ethical principles, have the same duties to
uphold the law and are required to maintain the same independence of
judgment from the clients, they should be permitted the same rights as
the other attorneys. Finally, given the scope of the world economy today,
with the increases in international trade, the growth in the numbers of
multinational companies with offices in many parts of the world and the
opening up of new markets, the EC's refusal to grant in-house counsel
the right to privilege will frustrate its desire to become a major player in
the international game by causing other countries to be suspicious of
dealings with EC companies and their attorneys for fear that their confi-
dentiality will be breached because of the rules of the EC.
3. In-house counsel may be better able to persuade client to behave
lawfully
In-house lawyers are very involved on a regular basis with many
aspects of the corporation." 3 It is possible that these attorneys are able
to influence the corporation not to do something that is illegal or ques-
tionable because of their long-standing relationship with the company or
the fact that they are more involved with the day-to-day affairs of the
Abramowitz, supra note 131, at 462 (citations omitted). See also, Valente v. PepsiCo,
68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del. 1975); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir.
1968) citing United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp, 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D.
Mass. 1950).
' See generally Corello, supra note 107, at 417; SPANGLER, supra note 170, at 75
(discussing that an in-house lawyer is not only expected to provide legal advice; often
times they also provide business advice, and are expected to ensure that business
transactions can occur).
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company." The officers and directors might be more willing to listen to
the in-house attorney whom they know and have developed a relationship
with when they might ignore an independent attorney hired to complete
a particular job who recommends the company not proceed." 5
[Iln-house attorneys differ from outside corporate counsel in that
they have better access to the facts, their personal and professional ties
are to their client, and they are often asked to make decisions, rather
than give advice. Therefore in-house counsel has greater ability to alter
her client's behavior and thus a corresponding duty to use that ability to
promote constructive behavior by the client. s6
Part of the role of in-house counsel is to help the company be as
profitable as possible, and in many cases, persuading the company to look
long-term and behave lawfully is in the best interest of the client and in
the best interest of justice.'87 If an attorney fails to cause his client to
behave lawfully, he might be in violation of the ethics rules
88 and
184 "[Y]et in-house counsel have an ongoing relationship with the client ... Unlike
most lawyers retained for litigation, in-house counsel develops a relationship before the
wrongful act; therefore, she is in a position to influence future behavior." Corello,
supra note 107, at 417 (citations omitted). "A corporation's attorney . . . is positioned
to impart 'preventive' legal advice; she acts as a private law enforcement agent."
Sexton, supra note 118, at 475 . "The more frequent contact between house counsel
and corporate representatives may produce a rapport that is alone sufficient to ensure
candor. Nearly all of the executives in the survey, for example, said that they com-
municate with house counsel more often than outside counsel." Alexander, supra note
130, at 277.
The data and conclusions from the Tompkins County Study state that more than
75% of the attorneys surveyed had been able to dissuade their clients from wrongdoing
because of confidentiality. Zacharias, supra note 125, at 381.
185 The influence of an attorney in suggesting an alternative course of action depends
mainly on the business person's prior experience with that attorney. 'You attain a lot
of credibility in the company,' says one lawyer, 'because of your aptitude with business
issues, your apparent willingness to really dig in and examine issues closely and de-
velop a solution and not take the easy way out and say you can't do something.'
SPANGLER, supra note 170, at 93.
" Corello, supra note 107, at 409 (citations omitted).
187 [In-house counsel's role as advisor is to promote the employer-client's long-term
interest. Thus she is obligated to ensure lawful behavior by her employer because failure
to comply with the law may cause harm to the corporation. This rule is consistent with
the lawyer's professional obligation not to participate in crime or fraud.
Corello, supra note 107, at 409 (citations omitted).
"'8 An attorney in any jurisdiction is not permitted to assist his client in criminal or
fraudulent activities. See relevant provisions, supra note 110 and accompanying text for
provisions governing U.S. lawyers. In the EC, lawyers must not violate the law in as-
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therefore subject to discipline. All attorneys must work to prevent un-
lawful behavior by their clients; however, in-house counsel's unique
position and early involvement in situations may make it even more like-
ly that they can encourage lawful behavior by their employers." 9
For example, in the John Deere case' in-house council attempted
to ensure that John Deere was obeying the competition laws of the EC by
inserting a clause that said that the contract was not intended to contra-
vene the law. Although John Deere was aware of the competition laws,
and the prohibition of export bans, in-house counsel attempted to ensure
that John Deere was within the law by including the "savings clause" in
the sales contract. The fact that the Commission found documents that
showed that in-house counsel was unsure whether the clause was suffi-
cient shows that the in-house counsel was attempting to convince the
company to act within the law. Although in-house counsel did not
succeed in causing John Deere to act within the law, it is unclear whether
independent counsel would have been more successful or would even
have done anything differently.
Additional examples of in-house counsel attempting to force legal
behavior from their employers can be seen in the "whistleblowing cas-
es"'191 that have been brought in the U.S. over the past several years."9
In many situations, in-house attorneys have been fired for refusing to
assist their companies in violating the law or for refusing to violate the
sisting their clients. The CCBE Code provides: "2.7 Subject to due observance of all
rules of law and professional conduct, a lawyer must always act in the best interests
of his client . . . 4.4 A lawyer shall never knowingly give false or misleading
information to the court." ADAMSON, supra note 23, at app. 5, xlvii, lii (1992).
189 The nature of an attorney as an arm of law enforcement lends support to the le-
gitimacy of the corporate need for legal counsel. The probability of bringing cor-
porations into compliance with the law is enhanced by the greater access of corporations
to counsel resulting from the availability of the privilege. Therefore, corporations need
effective legal counsel, perhaps even more than do individual clients, to advise them in
their varied and complex array of activities.
Waldman, supra note 106, at 492 n.102 (citation omitted).
'9 See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text for background and facts.
'9, "Whistle blower suits are intended to encourage employees to object to unlawful
conduct by their employer by deterring employers from firing workers who blow the
whistle, and ultimately to reduce unlawful conduct by employers." Corello, supra note
107, at 396.
192 The law in the U.S. is unsettled at present whether in-house counsel should or
should not be permitted to bring retaliatory discharge suits. Id. at 399-400. However,
in at least three cases where the in-house counsel was reporting violation of the law
by the in-house counsel "the courts found that public policy embodied in the Code and
the Rules was sufficient to justify retaliatory discharge suits by in-house counsel. Id. at
402. See also Dakin, supra note 176.
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code of ethics by which they are bound.'9 3 Cases brought by these
attorneys claim wrongful discharge. 194 Although many of these suits
have not been permitted, the fact that they have arisen show that attor-
neys do try to force lawful behavior by their employer even if it might
cost them their job.'95 Thus despite the fact that the attorney is em-
ployed by a company, and a company may ask the attorney to assist it in
violating a law or request the attorney to violate his ethical responsi-
bilities, many attorneys refuse even though the result could be unemploy-
ment.
2. Law firm lawyers are not more independent
The independence of outside firms as contrasted with in-house
counsel may be illusory.' 96 In many situations, independent lawyers
work extremely closely with one or only a very small number of clients
"' For discussion of cases concerning discharge of in-house lawyers, see, e.g.,
Dakin, supra note 176; Elliott M. Abramson, Why Not Retaliatory Discharge for
Attorneys: A Polemic, 58 TENN. L. REv. 271 (1991); Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful
Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 553 (1988); Petermann v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981); Klages v. Sperry Corp., 118
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 246 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health
Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Parker v.
M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Balla v.
Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991); Mourad v. Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 186
Mich. App. 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
"9 Increasingly, in-house counsel have been fired for refusing to violate professional
ethics or for urging their employer to comply with the law. Many have argued that
allowing in-house counsel the right to bring retaliatory discharge suits would "enable
in-house attorneys to abide by the ethical codes by weakening the force of an
employer's threat to discharge them." Corello, supra note 107, at 389-90.
' Many courts have also refused to recognize the right for in-house counsel to
recover in retaliatory discharge actions. The number of these cases also supports the
premise that in-house counsel do try to force their companies to obey the law. See,
e.g., Rand v. CF Indus., 797 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. 111. 1992); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584
N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ill. 1991); Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150
Ill. App. 3d 21 91986); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F. Supp 116, 118 (S.D. Tex.
1986); Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W. 2d 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 478 N.W. 2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
196 [S]ome attorneys assert that the vaunted independence of the law firm is more ap-
parent than real .... Typically, the judgment of when to call in outside counsel and
which firm to retain is left to the general counsel .... General counsel are unanimous
in saying that they do not hesitate to replace outside counsel if they are dissatisfied
with either the financial or the substantive aspects of the work they have commissioned.
SPANGLER, supra note 170, at 100.
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and may be as closely linked to the company as in-house lawyers are.
Competition for clients is extremely high and a firm that establishes a
relationship with a client is not going to be willing to leave the client.
In-house lawyers may, in fact, feel safer and more confident
leaving one corporation and seeking employment with another if they
disagree with the management .... Furthermore, in-house lawyers can
always get the advice of an outside lawyer in cases where they think
they may disagree with the board of directors. By contrast, a lawyer or
a small independent firm of lawyers may sometimes be willing to do
anything for a major client, particularly when it is struggling for sur-
vival.'"
Thus it seems that a firm, though technically independent, could easily
find that its survival required them to comply with the demands of their
client.
Independent lawyers are permitted the right to the attorney-client
privilege even though their independence and independent professional
judgment could potentially be impaired because of their heavy involve-
ment with certain clients. The number of clients that an attorney has is
not a useful measuring stick for their ability to remain independent and
free from undue influence by clients.'98 Whether an attorney has one
client or hundreds, he must maintain his independent professional judg-
ment or he will be in violation of his ethical responsibilities.' 9 If an
attorney is bound by the ethical rules in his country, the distinction
between in-house and independent attorneys' ability to maintain that inde-
pendence is weak because in many situations independent lawyers are
dependent on their clients for their economic survival in the same way
that in-house counsel are. Thus this argument does not seem sufficient to
warrant removal of the attorney-client privilege from in-house counsel
situations.
3. Where in-house and independent attorneys are bound by the same
rules and have the same duties to uphold the law, they should
receive the same treatment
In-house lawyers in some of the Member States are members of the
bar or law society in that country and are bound by the same rules of
,9 Christoforou, supra note 6, at 16.
,98 "The privilege does not depend on the number of clients a lawyer has." Natta
v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968).
,9 See supra notes 92 and 178.
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conduct and code of ethics as other lawyers in that country."l Clearly
in the countries where in-house counsel are not members of the bar and
are not expected to behave in the same manner as other lawyers, it would
be difficult to argue that they should have the right to the attorney-client
privilege because they are not acting as a lawyer for the company.0j
These lawyers are no longer practicing lawyers; 2 denying them the
privilege is sensible because there is not a mechanism to deal with
breaches of duties of lawyers when they are not lawyers. The decision to
refrain from granting the attorney-client privilege to these lawyers not
acting as lawyers is consistent with decisions in the U.S. that refuse to
privilege communications between in-house counsel and their client in
situations where in-house counsel is not acting in a legal capacity.2"3 In-
house lawyers who remain members of the bar are still required to
maintain independent judgment over their activities, and must not assist
their clients in committing crimes. They can, of course, be disciplined for
breaches of the codes of conduct."l
The decision by the ECJ not to allow in-house lawyers the right to
the attorney-client privilege is based on the assumption that they cannot
maintain independence and may be too involved with the company to
behave in the way other lawyers are expected to behave.2 5 "The Court
was content to see the form (i.e. uniform application of Community
protection of confidentiality) take precedence over the substance (i.e.
protection of confidentiality of in-house lawyers in the Member States
where they continue to be members of the appropriate lawyers' societies
of bars and are subject to the rules of professional ethics and disci-
pline)."2" This decision is overly broad. "Where the lawyer who is
employed remains a member of the profession and subject to its disci-
pline and ethics, .:. . he is to be treated for present purposes in the same
way as lawyers in private practice, so long as he is acting as a law-
yer. 20
7
In-house lawyers who remain members of the bar in their country
are faced with the problem of having the right to the attorney-client
20 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
2o See discussion supra note 99 (arguing whether these countries should reconsider
their exclusion of in-house counsel).
202 Lawyers who take positions as in-house counsel are not permitted to remain
members of the bar. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
203 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 108-09.
205 See Christoforou, supra note 6.
206 Christoforou, supra note 6, at 17.
201 Slynn's opinion, AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1655.
1995]
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privilege for matters within their country handled in the national courts
and not having the right to the privilege in matters that are governed by
EC law. This problem is made worse by the fact that the hope of the
CCBE Code is that Member States will change their rules so that all the
rules governing lawyers will be the same. Thus, the countries that do
recognize in-house lawyers as full members of the bar are actually being
asked to change the rules in their country to exclude them."8
4. Chilling Effect on Multi-National Corporations
The EC was created to permit its Member States to achieve econom-
ic and social development through removal of barriers between Member
States.209 As a policy matter, the EC should be concerned with the
effect the decision to exclude in-house counsel from the attorney-client
privilege has on relations with other non-member nations and companies
from those nations.
As the U.S.-European markets grow more interdependent, there is
a consequent increase in the occasions when European and U.S. compa-
nies need access to advice from U.S. lawyers to maintain and develop
the level of trade .... The Community therefore can and should offer
reciprocity to prospective Treaty partners, to avoid further unnecessary
conflicts and disparities."'
John Deere showed the potentially "[c]hilling effect.. . on commu-
nications and deliberations within multinational corporations on matters of
European competition law" because the opinion of an in-house attorney
was used to the considerable detriment of the company.2 '
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
The Preamble to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
states in part,
RESOLVED to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common
action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, AFFIRMING as the essential
objective of their efforts the constant improvement of the living and working conditions
of their peoples .... ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to
ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the
various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions .... RESOLVED by
thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling
upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts, HAVE
DECIDED to create a European Economic Community. ...
EEC TREATY, Preamble.
210 SPEDDING, supra note 40, at 208.
21' Burkard, supra note 1, at 680. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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Modem corporations are extremely concerned with cost cutting and
efficiency in order to remain competitive and profitable in today's econo-
my.
Only the in-house lawyer, assisted of course by outside legal experts,
can get that advice to the right people within the company in a cost
effective manner. Does it, therefore, make sense to penalize a company
through the loss of legal privilege if it selects this form of legal com-
munication, because the circumstances of modem multinational corporate
life so demand?"'
When a lawyer works in-house, he is already familiar with the actors, the
policies and the procedures.213 It is likely to be faster, simpler and more
economical" 4 for a legal issue to be discussed and resolved with an
attorney who is already familiar the corporation, than to explain every-
thing from the beginning."'
It seems unrealistic to expect companies outside the EC to change
the way they play the game because of the rule in the AM & S case, just
as it is unrealistic for non-EC countries to expect the EC to follow their
rules. The holding of the AM & S case may have been an "unnecessarily
broad answer to this concern and may deprive undertakings of useful
legal assistance. . . .Some companies may be deprived of useful legal
assistance because in-house lawyers may turn to outside counsel when
they could have rendered cheaper, more comprehensive, and more in-
formed advice." ' 6 This problem could be resolved if the EC extended
the attorney-client privilege to all attorneys who have the attorney-client
212 Burkard, supra note 1, at 686.
213 "The reason why economics generally favor in-house is because you have people
that understand the products and who understand the company and can work the
matters more efficiently than an outside counselor can. You get more productive hours
on the problem inside than outside." SPANGLER, supra note 170, at 71 (citation omit-
ted).
214 "In general, it is estimated that the cost of legal work done in-house is 35 to 50
percent less than the cost of comparable work referred out." SPANGLER, supra note 170,
at 71 (citation omitted).
2' This is not to say that attorneys with law firms cannot be familiar with all the
workings of a particular client corporation; however, in-house counsel work with the
corporation on a daily basis and do not have other clients or matters which may take
priority or take focus away from the needs of the business. "[T]he choice between
using in-house and outside legal talent is often not a choice between loyalty and inde-
pendence. . . . Frequently the choice is made on a more mundane basis: the cost of
in-house lawyers is substantially lower than that of the independent law firm."
SPANGLER, supra note 170, at 101.
216 Vollmer, supra note 50, at 17.
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privilege in their country and who are bound by a code of ethics that
requires independence and compliance with the law.
If in-house counsel who remain members of the bar or law society
in their country and are subject to discipline for failure to uphold the law
are given the attorney-client privilege, and lawyers who are not members
of the bar are not given the privilege, then the concern that in-house
counsel will be influenced by the company to the detriment of justice will
be decreased. In this way, those who are acting as attorneys are given the
attorney-client privilege and those who are not acting as attorneys are not
given the privilege. It seems that corporations have found a way to ensure
that their interests are represented and looked after in a cost-effective
manner but this solution can only be effective if in-house counsel is still
a member of the bar and permitted to invoke the attorney-client privilege.
V. CONCLUSIONS
One major goal of any legal system is to efficiently administer
justice. In order for corporations to exist within the legal system, and for
justice to occur when one of the parties is a corporation, lawyers need to
be involved. It seems unnecessary and even unjust to penalize a corpora-
tion for choosing to have lawyers on the payroll, rather than employing
them through an independent firm. The attorney-client privilege has been
recognized in both the U.S. and the EC as an important part of the
relationship between a lawyer and his clients. However, the distinction
between in-house and independent attorneys in the EC with respect to the
attorney-client privilege is not found in the U.S. The EC and its individ-
ual Member States should reconsider its exclusion of in-house counsel
because the underlying assumption, that in-house counsel cannot remain
free from influence by their client, is not necessarily true. It is possible
and perhaps even likely, that in-house counsel can influence the behavior
of the client more easily than independent lawyers, and that they actually
may be as independent in their actions as lawyers who are not employed
by a corporation. Thus allowing in-house counsel and their client compa-
ny the attorney-client privilege would allow the benefits that flow from
the existence of the privilege to occur in these additional situations. For
these reasons, the EC should reconsider its decision to prevent the
application of the attorney-client privilege to communications with in-
house counsel who remain members of the bar.
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